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ABSTRACT 
 
RUSSIAN WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (WTO) 
 ACCESSION FAILURES IN 2003 AND 2007  
UNDER PUTIN’S FIRST AND SECOND PRESIDENTIAL TERMS 
(2000-2008) 
 
Yalçın, Aybike 
M.A., Department of International Relations 
Supervisor: Prof. Norman Stone 
 
 
May 2014 
 
 
 This thesis focuses on the Russian WTO accession failures under Putin’s 
first and second presidential terms in order to locate the reasons for Russia not 
becoming a WTO member in 2003 and 2007. In addition to examining the nature 
and decision making process of the WTO, the thesis traces the history of the 
Russian WTO membership which took 19 years in total, by taking as a starting 
point the Yeltsin era and analyzing the reforms for transforming the Russian 
communist economy into a market economy. This study addresses Russia’s 
commitment areas to be a WTO member in order to evaluate the possible effects 
of the WTO accession on the Russian sectors such as agriculture, manufacturing 
and services. Additionally, throughout the thesis, the reasons for the increased 
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popularity regarding the Russian WTO membership with Putin’s presidency and 
the possible causes of the negative change in Putin’s rhetoric towards the WTO in 
his second presidential term are considered. 
 
Keywords: Russia, General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), World 
Trade Organization (WTO), Putin, Yeltsin, Reform, Commitments 
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ÖZET 
 
RUSYA’NIN PUTİN’İN BİRİNCİ VE İKİNCİ DEVLET  
BAŞKANLIĞI DÖNEMLERİ İÇERİSİNDE 2003 VE 2007  
YILLARINDA DÜNYA TİCARET ÖRGÜTÜ’NE (DTÖ)  
ÜYELİĞİNDEKİ BAŞARISIZLIK 
(2000-2008) 
 
Yalçın, Aybike 
Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Norman Stone 
 
 
Mayıs 2014 
 
 
 Bu çalışma, hususiyetle Rusya’nın DTÖ’ye girişi için hedeflenen 2003 ve 
2007 yıllarında yaşanan başarısızlıkların sebeplerini bulabilmek amacıyla Putin’in 
birinci ve ikinci dönem başkanlığı sürecine odaklanmaktadır. Tez, DTÖ’nün yapısı 
ve karar alma sürecinin yanı sıra Yeltsin’in devlet başkanlığı döneminden 
başlayarak, Rus ekonomisini komünist yapıdan kurtarıp pazar ekonomisi haline 
getirmek amacıyla uygulanan reformları da içine alarak Rusya’nın 19 yıl süren 
DTÖ üyeliği macerasına ışık tutmaktadır. Bu çalışmada ayrıca, Rusya ekonomisini 
oluşturan örneğin tarım, sanayi ve hizmet sektörlerinin Rusya’nın DTÖ’ye 
girişinde karşılaşılabileceği olası etkileri değerlendirebilmek amacıyla Rusya’nın 
DTÖ üyeliği çerçevesinde verdiği taahhütlere ayrıntılı bir şekilde yer 
vi 
 
verilmektedir. Bunlara ek olarak, tezde Rusya’nın DTÖ’ye girişi konusuna 
Putin’in devlet başkanlığıyla artan ilgi ve Putin’in ikinci başkanlık döneminde 
DTÖ’ye ilişkin söylemlerinde yer alan olumsuz eğilimin sebepleri ile ilgili 
analizler de yapılmaktadır. 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Rusya, Gümrük Tarifeleri ve Ticaret Genel Anlaşması 
(GATT), Dünya Ticaret Örgütü (DTÖ), Putin, Yeltsin, Reform, Taahhütler 
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CHAPTER I 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 The dissolution of the Soviet Union into fifteen independent states was one 
of the great dramas of the 20
th
 century. After the breakup of the Soviet Union in 
1991, Russia experienced a long and thorny process to transform its centrally 
planned economy into a running market economy. Being a part of the global 
market was not easy or sudden for Russia due to its geological, geographical and 
historical conditions. Within the Soviet Union, state planning was used in the 
economy and interference was pervasive. The volume of export and import as well 
as the allocation of imports were determined through a central plan. Producers had 
no contact with foreign firms and were transferring their output to the state at set 
internal wholesale prices. The external rouble exchange rate and all other prices 
were set by the government. With the breakup of the Soviet Union, all these 
practices ended in favor of capitalist practices. This process was very compelling 
for Russia.  
 Russia was the largest of the fifteen independent states after the collapse of 
the Soviet Union with approximately half of the population and more than half of 
the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). In diplomatic affairs, Russia was accepted as 
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the successor of the Soviet Union. After the dissolution of the communist system, 
with the aims of liberalization, stabilization, privatization and institutional and 
structural change in the Russian economy, a group of young economists such as 
Gaidar, Chernomyrdin and Chubais had been appointed under Yeltsin’s 
presidential term and several radical economic reforms were announced between 
the years 1991-2000. In a very short time, Russia had freed most of the prices in 
the economy except those which had economic and “moral importance”1 and 
privatized thousands of state estates. The transformation of the economy had some 
costs, so the Russian people suffered a lot. Especially, during the economic crises 
of 1998 and 2008 Russian’s lives were worse than ever. 
 Being a member of the WTO, an international regime that covers a large 
majority of the world market, was an important step for Russia in order to be 
accepted by the global economy. That was why right after the 1993 breakup of the 
Soviet Union, President Yeltsin had started the Russian membership process by 
applying to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade GATT. Yet, contrary to 
the initial expectations, the process was completed in 2012 with the signature of 
President Putin under his third presidential term, some 19 years after starting the 
application process. Russia was the only G8, G20 and BRIC
2
 member which was 
not in the WTO when the accession had completed. As such, this situation was an 
international political economy anomaly. 
                                                          
1
 In 1992, most of the prices were freed except for domestic energy prices and the prices of social    
necessities such as vodka to prevent society from economic shocks and “destructive populism.” 
Pekka Sutela, The Political Economy of Putin’s Russia, (New York: Routledge, 2012), 13. 
2
 Group of Eight (G8) consists of eight large world economic powers, Group of Twenty (G20) 
consists of 20 major world economies and lastly BRICS consists of five major emerging national 
economies. Russia is a member of these three groups. 
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 For Russia, there were several benefits of being a WTO member such as 
being able to access export markets in a secure way because the membership 
would prevent WTO countries from imposing random quotas and tariffs on Russia, 
being a part of the group that decides the global trade rules, getting benefit from 
the international trade tribunal and increasing foreign direct investments (FDIs) to 
Russia. However, it also should be noted that there were plenty of advantages in 
the Russian WTO accession for the WTO members. For instance, the European 
Union (EU), as Russia’s largest natural gas and oil market would greatly benefit 
from the Russian membership because Russia would be bound by the international 
regime and it could not easily use the increase in oil prices and cut in natural gas as 
a threat towards the EU after the Russian WTO accession. Moreover, Russia 
would be a safer place for the investments after its WTO membership, which was 
an advantage for the foreign investors. 
 There were several causes that affected the Russian WTO accession delays, 
but this study focuses on the reasons that contributed specifically to 2003 and 2007 
WTO accession failures by examining Putin’s first and second presidential terms 
between the years 2000 and 2008. This focus is a modest attempt to comprehend 
the change in the economic structure of the Russian economy after the demise of 
the Soviet Union and the obstacles that prevented Russia from being a WTO 
member for 19 years, which was even longer than the China’s accession process, 
which took 15 years. 
 This paper discovers that Russia could not accede to the WTO in the target 
year 2003 because of technical reasons. Although both Russia and WTO parties 
believed in the possibility of the accession in the planned year and the political 
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atmosphere was appropriate for the membership, due to the nonfulfillment of the 
commitments that Russia had been given for being accepted to the WTO and the 
handicap of the WTO decision making process, the accession was postponed. 
Therefore, it is obvious that the year 2003 was not a realistic date. After the 2003 
accession failure, the end of the year 2007 was given as a target date, but this time 
even though most of the technical constraints were solved except for the consensus 
rule in decision making, the political reasons such as the tensions with Georgia and 
Putin’s negative speeches on the Russian WTO accession, which created 
untrustable atmosphere for the Russian membership, influenced the postponement 
of the Russian WTO accession.  
 This paper delivers a timely review of the completed accession process 
because the Russian WTO negotiations came to an end in 2012 with the Russian 
WTO membership. However, as being president three times during the accession 
process, the study mostly will try to find the reasons for the delay during Putin’s 
first and second presidential terms. While examining Putin’s era, the decision 
making process of the WTO, the causes of the increased popularity towards the 
Russian WTO accession in Putin’s tenure and the decrease of the interest in 
Putin’s words towards the WTO membership in his second term will be 
discovered. Throughout the thesis, Putin’s first presidential term covers the years 
2000-2004 while the second presidential term covers his reelection years 2004-
2008. At the end of the paper, the years after 2012 is pointed out as his third 
presidential term.   
 In order to achieve the aims of the study, the thesis is divided into five 
chapters. After the first chapter for introduction, the second chapter focuses on the 
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nature of the WTO such as the organizational structure and decision making rule 
of the organization as well as the Yeltsin presidency (1991-2000). The study aimed 
to create a comprehensive background about the organization in order to detect if 
there are some causes regarding the Russian WTO accession delay in 2003 and 
2007 rooted in the nature of the WTO. It was found that the consensus as a 
decision making rule was the technical reason for the postponement in both 
targeted years. Furthermore, the chapter includes crucial reforms of Yeltsin era, 
which aimed to liberalize and privatize the Russian economy, and their effects on 
the Russian WTO membership process.  
 The third chapter explicates Russia’s commitments areas in order to be a 
WTO member such as in agriculture and manufactured goods, services, 
intellectual property and trade related investments to understand the possible 
effects of the WTO membership on the Russian sectors such as automobile and 
chemical industry. Moreover, if there are technical reasons for the Russian 2003 
and 2007 accession failures rooted in commitments areas, these points are 
explored.  
The fourth chapter analyzes the economic policy and attempts to be a WTO 
member in Putin’s presidential terms. In this chapter, Putin’s era is examined 
separately in an attempt to discern the causes that prevented Russia from being a 
WTO member in 2003 and 2007. Furthermore, why Russian WTO membership 
gained popularity in Putin’s presidential terms and the reasons why Putin’s 
rhetoric towards the Russian WTO accession changed in a negative way towards 
the end of his second presidency are other analyses that are given place in this 
chapter. 
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The final chapter moves forward to view the Russian WTO accession 
process after 2008 and raises points for future research by comparing the Russian 
stance towards the economic sanctions of the US in the 2008 Russian-Georgian 
War and 2014 Russian-Ukrainian War. It is here questioned whether the Russian 
threat to the US in terms of opening a lawsuit with the WTO for the US economic 
sanctions against Russia after the Ukrainian intervention, which are deemed to be 
against to the WTO rules, is the result of the confidence that Russia gained after 
being a WTO member in 2012. Finally the thesis considers if Russia will exploit 
the WTO tools effectively in order to gain interest in the economic and political 
arenas in the future. 
While conducting this study, the academic literature including books and 
articles and publications issued by policy advising institutions were consulted. 
Furthermore, because the topic is quite recent and it was difficult to find printed 
books in which updated events about the Russian accession are stated, some of the 
reliable online newspaper articles were cited, especially those which contained 
some essential quotations from relevant authorities. The WTO web-site was one of 
the referenced resources throughout the study. Especially agreements and 
declarations were extracted from the WTO web-site for analysis. 
As primary sources, publicly accessible GATT and WTO papers that were 
obtained via the WTO web-site archive in relation to the Russian accession 
negotiations were used in the study. In this thesis, the online archives were 
scanned because they were the first hand information source related to the process. 
For example, the Memorandum of Foreign Trade submitted to the Working Party 
(WP) prepared by Russians was documented as a GATT paper and there was 
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valuable information showing the situation of Russian economy in 1994 in this 
document. Furthermore, the 2011 WP report was a highly detailed document with 
approximately 600 pages, including the state of play in Russian trade and 
economy. In addition to these documents, there were agreements such as the 1994 
Marrakesh Agreement and 1973 Tokyo Declaration that were located in online 
archives.   
However, GATT and WTO meeting minutes were sometimes not so 
helpful in terms of revealing the actual bilateral relations between the countries. 
For instance, how Russia conducted its lobbying activities for its WTO accession 
cannot be inferred by reviewing the final reports of the multilateral meetings.
3
 
Therefore, at this point, the public addresses of the ambassadors and political 
individuals who were communicating with Russia gained importance. 
In terms of the scanned literature for this thesis, it was challenging to find 
analytical studies about the Russian economy especially related to Putin’s 
presidential terms because it is a quite recent history and the produced literature 
was mostly related to the transformation of Russia after communism, which was a 
much more attractive issue rather than the normalization of the Putin years.
4
 
However, according to the analysis of the existing data, within the literature, there 
are two kinds of materials. The first group is about the commitments that Russia 
gave to the WTO to be a member and effects of these WTO requests to the 
Russian economy whereas the second group is about the problems of the Russian 
WTO accession process. The general observation related to the existing literature 
                                                          
3
 Simon J. Evenett and Carlos A. Primo Braga, “WTO Accession: Lessons from Experience,” 
World Bank Group (2005): 2. 
4
 Sutela, The Political Economy of Putin’s Russia, xvii. 
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is the evaluation on an incomplete Russian WTO membership process and the 
usage of the outdated sources. Furthermore, there was the lack of a single source in 
which the whole process was explained. That is why this study will be different 
from the others with its examination of the process from the beginning to the end 
and the inclusion of the updated resources.  
This study is qualitative research in which the work is mostly inductive, in 
other words “from the facts up” as opposed to quantitative analyses which are 
mostly deductive and from “theory down.”5 Specifically, the historical analysis 
method was used to find the answer for the research question of why Russia could 
not be a WTO member in the targeted years of 2003 and 2007 under Putin’s 
presidential terms. Multi-causal explanations about the Russian accession failures 
are discovered and like most other historical analyses, the thesis does not generate 
arguments that are applicable to other similar cases. The chosen method allowed 
for understanding and interpreting the Russian WTO accession process and 
historical events on the way to the Russian WTO membership. By applying 
historical analysis, the reasons that prevented Russia from entering into the WTO 
in Putin’s terms were discovered by providing their historical links in a detailed 
way. However, by its nature, the study required quantitative inputs in order to 
show the change in the economic situation in Russia after its dissolution. At this 
point, the problem related to the reliability of statistical data which were taken 
from the sources, occurred.  
There was the long lasting debate about the falsification of statistics for 
propaganda purposes in the former Soviet era and there is continued skepticism 
                                                          
5
 Leslie M. Tutty, Michael A. Rothery and Richard M. Grinnell, Qualitative Research for Social 
Workers, (Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 1996), 12. 
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towards the data provided by Russia due to the lack of information related to the 
Russian regions after the breakup of the Soviet Union. Especially when the trade 
issues were the point in question, the Soviet informal shadow economy presents 
researchers with uncertainty about the given numbers. However, throughout the 
study some statistics were compulsorily used to support the given information. 
Even though they may not be entirely accurate, they are the best estimates on 
hand.  
Another complication of this study was to relieve the topic from being a 
purely economic paper because there were some issues in the history of the 
Russian Federation that could not be explained without mentioning economic 
terms; however, such issues were largely described in the form of footnotes in 
order not to go into too much detail.  
10 
 
 
 
CHAPTER II 
  
 
THE NATURE OF THE WTO AND THE RUSSIAN 
MEMBERSHIP PROCESS BEFORE PUTIN (1993-2000) 
 
 
 
 Russia first applied to the GATT under the Yeltsin presidency in 1993. 
Thus, the Russian WTO accession process, which took 19 years in total, started. 
While searching for the reasons for the Russian WTO accession failures under 
Putin’s presidential terms in years 2003 and 2007 throughout the document, this 
chapter will be helpful in providing a basis to comprehend some of the technical 
problems that occurred during the membership process due to the nature and the 
consensus building process of the WTO.  
 Another important feature of the chapter is its inclusion of the reforms of 
Yeltsin’s presidential term and evaluation of their effects on the Russian WTO 
membership process. Learning what improvements were achieved on Russia’s way 
to WTO entry by the end of Yeltsin’s presidency is necessary for being able to 
clarify what Putin added specifically to the process. 
 
2.1 Understanding the GATT and WTO 
 After the Second World War, the victor countries decided to create 
international institutions to provide post war stability and prevent future wars. The 
11 
 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank and International Trade 
Organization (ITO) were the three economic institutions established with this aim. 
However, because the United States (US) did not agree on the ITO charter, GATT, 
which was signed in 1947 between contracting parties, turned into a de facto 
international organization for trade.
6
  
 Average tariff levels of the countries were really high after the war
7
 and 
GATT aimed to reduce these tariffs which were evaluated as the main barriers 
blocking free trade. The main principles were non-discrimination, open market, 
prevention of damage to the trade interests of members and creation of a 
negotiating framework.
8
 The first five multilateral rounds of GATT were on 
reducing tariff rates; the sixth round was called the Kennedy Round and dealt with 
the problems of developing countries whereas the seventh round was known as the 
Tokyo Round and focused on non-trade barriers.
9
 The Uruguay Round in 1994 
was the last round of the GATT
10
 because there, the GATT was amended and the 
WTO was established with the increasing of the number of member countries.
11
  
 The WTO, which became effective starting on 1 January 1995, is not a 
simply wider form of the GATT. The WTO rather is an international organization 
including not only goods trade but also services trade and intellectual property 
                                                          
6
 Sheo Prasad Shukla, “From GATT to WTO and Beyond,” United Nations University World 
Institutute for Development Economics Research 159 (2000): 2. 
7
 See Appendix I for the average tariff levels of some countries for the years 1913, 1925, 1931, 
1952 and 2007, taken from Chad P. Bown, Self Enforcing Trade: Developing Countries and WTO 
Dispute Settlement (Washington: Brookings Institution, 2009), 12. 
8
 Nicole Timoney, “GATT: The New Round of Trade Negotiations,” Development Review (1986), 
last accessed December 14, 2013, http://www.trocaire.org/resources/tdr-article/gatt-new-round-
trade-negotiations. 
9
 Fred Bergsten, “Fifty Years of the GATT/WTO: Lessons from the Past for Strategies for the 
Future,” Peterson Institute for International Economics (1998), last accessed December 14, 2013, 
http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/paper.cfm?researchid=312. 
10
 See Appendix II for the GATT rounds, their places, dates and the subjects covered.  
11
 Bown, Self Enforcing Trade, 12. 
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rights (IPRs) and is much more systematic and powerful with its international 
trade dispute mechanism. The WTO is a rules based entity and negotiated 
agreements constitute its rules. Table I shows how the six main areas that compose 
the WTO fit together (umbrella WTO Agreement, goods, services, intellectual 
property, disputes and trade policy reviews). 
 The WTO’s ultimate aim can be summarized as to achieve worldwide trade 
liberalization as well as facilitation. The main tool to achieve this target is to 
reduce tariff barriers amongst countries. The secondary aims of the WTO can be 
listed as achieving non-discrimination in trade, making the trade more competitive 
but on the other hand more predictable and transparent and putting the trade 
system under the guarantee of the dispute settlement mechanism. 
 
2.1.1 Decision Making and Consensus Building within the WTO 
 In general, one of the decision making rules, which are majoritarian, 
weighted voting and sovereign equality, are used by international organizations 
and sometimes a combination of these rules is preferred. However, international 
organizations often require the consent of all members. According to Buzan, 
consensus is the most selected way because there is a “comparative merit of 
consensus” in comparison to other decision making rules such as preventing the 
negotiations to be conducted under the domination of the numerically superior 
group of nations and reflecting geopolitical power of the member states in the 
organizations.
12
 For instance, Buzan gives the example of majoritarian voting and 
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indicates that this rule is dangerous because as a result of such a decision making 
rule, powerful alienated minorities can be created.
13
 
 In GATT, only voting was stated as a decision making rule,
14
 but in 
practice mostly informal version of consensus had been applied and this change 
was reflected to the WTO Agreement even though the voting rule was retained. 
However, although there is consensus decision making in the WTO, Steinberg 
questions how some powerful actors such as the US and the EU can dominate 
bargaining and outcomes of the GATT or WTO and if they would dominate, why 
they would bound themselves to maintain consensus rule. What he concludes in 
his article is that “GATT and WTO decision making rules based on sovereign 
equality of states are organized hypocrisy in the procedural context.”15  
 Schott and Watal have argued another issue about the consensus decision 
making rule in the WTO. By giving the Seattle Protests as an example, they 
address the issue that even though consensus is the decision making rule of the 
WTO, the consensus building process stopped working properly.
16
 The reasons for 
their argument were laid down as the increasing accessions to the WTO by the 
developing countries and their active membership as well as the obligation that 
was brought in the Uruguay Round to the countries to commit to the trade barriers 
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and practices, which made the members more conscious about the decision making 
process.
17
  
 However, there is an informal process called the Green Room founded in 
the Tokyo Round. It has continued to be used in order to overcome the difficulty 
of taking decisions in such a huge WTO body and make the negotiation process 
more efficient and effective with a limited number of members. Even though this 
process achieved successful results at some meetings, there is criticism of the 
process because it only is composed of approximately 20 members, not so 
transparent or efficient and make other members passive.
18
 As coalition building is 
becoming more and more important in the governance of the multilateral system, 
several other groups also were created and evaluated as a great chance to be 
represented in the WTO consensus building process with more institutional 
access.
19
 
 In short, the WTO is a member-driven entity and takes decisions by 
consensus rule either by the member states’ ministers, which is the highest 
representation, or by their ambassadors or delegates. Except for the Appellate 
Body, Dispute Settlement panels and plurilateral committees, all WTO members 
can participate in all committees and councils.
20
 Table II shows the organizational 
schema of the WTO. 
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2.1.1.1 US Effect on the WTO Decision Making Process 
 The US, with its huge economy and political power, has had an effect on 
the GATT and later on the WTO. Even though the WTO is a member-driven 
organization and decisions are taken by the consensus of all members,
21
 the impact 
of the US in the WTO decision making process is irrefutable. By initiating new 
trade rounds, shaping the agenda of the meetings and lobbying in multilateral 
rounds to achieve the results that are advantageous for the US economy, the US 
affects the WTO decision making. The US impact on the initiation and the results 
of the Uruguay Round and the establishment of the WTO in 1994 showed how the 
US values were embedded in the WTO; however, even though the US words are 
taken seriously into consideration, it also will be wrong to disregard the EU and 
Japanese influence.
22
 The words of the US Trade Representative Ron Kirk in 2009 
also were the proof of the US’s leading role in the WTO: "The US engages with 
other economies and plays a leadership role at the WTO in order to boost 
American exports and grow the well-paid jobs Americans want and need."
23
 
 Aside from the US effect on the WTO’s administrative issues, the US 
benefits from the WTO dispute settlement mechanism more than other countries. 
Through this mechanism, the US protects its economic interests in the 
international arena and prevents the other WTO members from violating the 
international trade rules. For instance, between years 1995-2007, among 53 of the 
US cases, 28 of them were successfully concluded whereas 25 of them were 
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resulted in the US’s favor before the closing of the files.24 Therefore, by using this 
tool effectively, the US gains an advantage to open the markets to its traders. 
Furthermore, US lead the WTO by attending to and shaping the WP of the 
applicant countries from which the US wants to benefit in economic terms, for 
instance the Chinese and Russian accession WPs. 
 
2.1.1.2 EU Effect on the WTO Decision Making Process 
 EU member states are represented in the WTO by the European 
Commission as one body because of their common trade policy. The EU is one of 
the key players in the WTO, even though this situation slightly changed with the 
existence of important developing countries.
25
 The EU can be regarded as the 
normative power of the WTO and pursues normative issues as long as these issues 
have resonance in the EU’s politics such as environmental, health and labor 
issues.
26
 Furthermore, the EU was defined as a leader in trade negotiations “only 
sometimes, in certain areas and with mixed success.”27  
 Whatever power had the EU had, in 2006 by being the first largest exporter 
and the second largest importer in the world, any multilateral trade agreement 
could not be concluded without EU presence.
28
 The impact of the EU in launching 
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the trade rounds, creating the informal agenda and affecting the outcomes of the 
rounds together with the US is irrefutable.
29
 
 The EU is effective in the WTO decision making process. The reasons that 
make the EU a powerful actor in the WTO are listed as the economic presence of 
the Union, its direct use of economic statecraft, its functioning as a model, and 
influence derived from its formal institutional structure.
30
 However, even though 
the EU is powerful in the WTO, it is not possible to describe the EU as the leader 
in the WTO because it is stated that the institutional framework does not allow the 
EU to concentrate on the external leadership.31 
 
2.1.2 WTO Accession Process  
 According to Article XII of the WTO Agreement, the only necessary 
condition to be a WTO member is “possessing full autonomy in the conduct of its 
trade policies.”32 However, it is obvious that the WTO accession is a negotiation 
process and not so easy and automatic like the accession to the other international 
bodies such as the IMF or World Bank because the WP of the WTO takes all 
decisions by consensus decision making. Namely, by the end of the preparations, 
all WTO members should be satisfied or at least should not vote against the 
membership of a certain country’s WTO membership. There is a well-established 
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sequence of rules prepared under the title of “Technical Note on the Accession 
Process” for showing the itinerary for the WTO membership.33 
 The WTO accession process
34
 starts with the formal request of the 
applicant country for the WTO membership and after the WTO General Council’s 
approval, a WP which is open to all WTO members’ participation, is established to 
examine the request and submit the results to the General Council. The applicant 
country is responsible for submitting a memorandum in which the country’s trade 
and legal regime are stated in a detailed way. This document constitutes the basis 
for the questions that the WP will prepare. In the questions and answers stage, the 
questions asked by the WP should be in a written form, and the applicant country 
has the responsibility to reply to them, however this stage can be exhausting. In the 
Russian case between the years 1995-1997, approximately 3500 questions were 
directed by taking the memorandum basis.
35
 At the end of this period, an informal 
document called the Factual Summary of Points Raised is circulated and this 
document provides the basis of the draft WP Report.  
 The following stage is the negotiation of the applicant’s terms of accession 
and is conducted under two lines, which are negotiations on multilateral rules and 
bilateral market access negotiations. Schedules on concessions and commitments 
on goods and services in which the initial offers from the applicant country are 
prepared and based on these information bilateral negotiations with the WP and 
the applicant country are conducted. The results of these negotiations also are 
attached to the accession package. Terms and conditions for the entry of the 
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applicant country are prepared by the WP after examining the memorandum. As 
the last stage, the accession package, which includes the WP’s report, the 
commitments on rules, the schedule on the goods and services, is submitted to the 
General Council for approval. After obtaining approval from the General Council, 
the applicant country is free to sign the Protocol on Accession, which should be 
ratified in the national parliament. After 30 days from the ratification, the country 
becomes a WTO member.
36
 
 The WTO membership process has its own written rules and the WTO 
follows these rules for each and every accession application. Even though the 
harmonization process takes a different length of time for each country, the 
procedure does not change. Therefore, the parameters of the WTO accession are 
economical and technical rather than political. However, it also is the situation that 
without political will, the negotiations cannot be concluded. It is requested from 
the applicant to align its legal base, institutional structures and applications with 
the WTO. As a consequence of the membership, the country gains the chance to 
obtain the same consessions from developed countries as the other members and 
benefit from the guaranteeing tool to secure its trade interests in the dispute 
settlement mechanism.  
 In comparison with the WTO, to be a member of the GATT sometimes 
could be more political. Namely, not all the members in WTO followed the same 
path like Russia and WTO membership of non-market economies is a prime 
example of the situation. The accession of East-European countries into GATT 
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without meeting the requirements of the market economy was not seen as 
dangerous for the GATT regime; it was a kind of East-West issue for the members 
because of their relatively small trade power.
37
 The aim of the inclusion of these 
economies was not to increase trade volume or economic cooperation; rather, the 
main target was to show that these countries are part of the Western economic 
system.
38
  
 
2.1.2.1 Russian WTO Accession Incentives 
 The Russian GATT membership application was a continuation of the 
process, which was started by Mikhail Gorbachev, and targeted to end the isolation 
of the Russian nation from the world economy. When Russia applied to the GATT, 
111 countries were already GATT members.
39
 By including such a number of 
countries, the GATT had become the authority which sets the rules for the world 
economy. The accession to the GATT became vital for Russia in order to be 
effective on the decisions of the organization related to world trade.
40
  
 Achieving trade advantages was another incentive when Russia applied for 
the GATT membership. The main target was the non-discriminatory treatments for 
the Russian exporters in the world market.
41
 Countries that were not GATT 
members could face some kinds of export prohibitions without being given any 
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reason that they could be conducted.
42
 This situation was not to the benefit of the 
traders. The essence of the non-discrimination in trade is the “most favored nation 
(MFN)” clause of the WTO. This clause guarantees that any kind of trade 
concessions provided to any country also should be automatically extended to all 
WTO member countries.
43
  
 While Yeltsin was applying for the GATT membership, it also was 
intended to benefit from the dispute settlement mechanism of the organization. 
This system is used when a country is sure about another country’s unfairness in 
its trade relations and if this situation damages the complainant country’s 
economic interests. In such a situation, the country that had the problem could 
bring the issue to the GATT. After an investigation, if the GATT has found the 
country faulty, the GATT could require from the complainee country to cease the 
existing implementation or warn to introduce a compensatory practice to retrieve 
the losses of the complainant country.
44
 Therefore, being able to use such a 
binding mechanism was important for the Soviet Union, especially in the era of an 
economic transformation because either Russian traders or the other world traders 
were not accustomed to encountering each other in the real market.  
 In addition to these benefits, Russia aimed to attract the attention of the 
foreign investors, to have an opportunity for the Russian investors in other GATT 
countries and to become more competitive in the global market.
45
 After 
membership, Russian economy would be more competitive because with the flow 
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of foreign goods to the market, domestic products’ quality would increase in order 
to put them to a level in which they could compete with the foreign goods.
46
 
 
2.1.2.2 Russian WTO Membership Application 
 Starting from the beginning of the foundation of the GATT, the Soviet 
Union was not in favor of being a part of it because the socialist system was 
considered as a rival to capitalism.
47
 The Soviet Union maintained the same 
position by not attending the Tokyo Round of trade negotiations between 1973 and 
1979, even though in the Tokyo Declaration, which was released on 14 September 
1973, to set out the goals to be achieved during the next round of international 
trade negotiations, it was stated as the round that was “open to any other 
government, through a notification to the Director General.”48  
 In 1982, Soviet Russia changed the resistance strategy and decided to 
integrate itself with the liberal world economy, but this time Soviet Union’s 
observer status application for the GATT Ministerial Meeting in November was 
rejected by the WTO by referring to the reason that the observer status of the 
Soviet Union could negatively affect the Eastern countries’ decisions and 
politicize the GATT atmosphere.
49
 The reasons for the change in Soviet Union’s 
stance towards the GATT could be the GATT membership of the socialist 
countries, deteriorating domestic economy and political events related to 
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Afhganistan War.
50
 Continuing its efforts, the Soviet Union applied for observer 
status in the Uruguay Round trade negotiations in 1986, but this application also 
was refused.
51
 With regard to the last rejection of the Soviet Union’s application, 
Richter states that “denial of observer status to the Soviet Union was short-
sighted”52 and as a consequence of the regret from the WTO side, in 1989 during 
the Malta Summit, US President Bush offered to give observer status to the Soviet 
Union.
53
 Following this explanation, in 1990, Soviet Union officially applied for 
the GATT observer status by stating that, “Government of the USSR would like to 
get acquainted with the methods of work of various GATT bodies.”54 
 As a consequence of this request, on 16 May 1990, the GATT Council 
approved unanimously the observer status of the Soviet Union
55
 and many 
speakers during the Council expressed their happiness for seeing the Soviet Union 
among themselves.
56
 In 1992, the GATT contracting parties agreed that the 
observer status of the former USSR would be continued by Russia.
57
  
 On 11 June 1993, it was time for the Russian Federation to apply for GATT 
membership and President Boris Yeltsin submitted the document in which it was 
stated that: 
The Government of the Russian Federation applies for accession of the 
Government of the Russian Federation to the GATT under its article 
XXXIII and hereby requests that this application be given due 
consideration by the Contracting Parties in accordance with the usual 
                                                          
50
 Naray, Russia and the World Trade Organisation, 17. 
51
 William L. Richter, “Soviet Participation in GATT: A Case for Accession,” Journal of 
International Law and Politics 20, no. 2 (1988): 477-479. 
52
 Richter, “Soviet Participation in GATT,” 523. 
53
 Mikhail Gorbachev, Memoirs, (London: Bantam Books, 1995), 660. 
54
 GATT Document, L/6654, 12 March 1990.  
55
 Naray, Russia and the World Trade Organisation, 20. 
56
 GATT Document, C/M/241, 8 June 1990. 
57
 GATT Document, C/M/254, 10 March 1992. 
24 
 
procedures, including the establishment of a Working Party to examine 
the accession of the Government of the Russian federation to the GATT.
58
 
 
 As a consequence of this application, the Council established a WP headed 
by Chairman W. Rossier, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of 
Switzerland to the GATT with the usual terms of reference.
59
 The WP was 
composed of 67 countries in June 1993.
60
 After April 1994, as a result of the Final 
Act of the Uruguay Round, all the GATT accessions were transformed into the 
WTO accessions and starting from the beginning of 1995 Russia tried to be a 
WTO member rather than a GATT member. However, with the establishment of 
the WTO, it became more difficult to be a member of the organization because of 
the newly incorporated Uruguay Round agreements which were dealing with the 
trade in services, Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs), 
and Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMs).
61
 
 
2.2 The Importance of the Yeltsin Era for the Russian WTO Membership 
Process 
 Yeltsin’s presidential term is important to comprehend how such a huge 
central economy was turned into a market economy and which reforms were 
conducted for this aim. Furthermore, learning the improvements on the Russian 
WTO accession process that had been achieved while essential reforms related to 
the economy were being implemented is crucial. 
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 The collapse of the Soviet Union is considered dramatic because it was 
such a huge entity with fifteen Soviet Socialist Republics. The Soviet Union’s end 
caused a total transformation of the economy and society. On 12 June 1991, 
Yeltsin, with 57.3% of the votes, was democratically elected as the President of 
Russia.
62
 Following the election, August 1991 coup d'état against Gorbachev,63 
which was arranged by most of his colleagues from the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union (CPSU), occurred but the coup was suppressed.
64
 After this attempt, 
Yeltsin made important political decisions such as suspending the actions of the 
CPSU and dividing the Committee for State Security (KGB) into agencies in order 
to prevent similar future actions towards him.
65
  
 On 8 December 1991, Yeltsin organized a secret meeting with the leaders 
of Belarus and Ukraine in which they agreed to dissolve the Soviet Union and on 
22 December 1991, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was formed.
66
 
According to Yeltsin this event was “a lawful alteration of the existing order” 
because it “was a revision of the Union Treaty among three major republics of that 
Union.”67 On 25 December 1991, Gorbachev resigned and the Russian flag 
replaced the Soviet Union flag at the Kremlin.
68
 
 Regarding the economic aspects, the reform process that had already 
started with Gorbachev continued with Yeltsin’s reforms. The transformation from 
the Soviet economic system to the market economy started in the mid-1980s and in 
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1985 with Gorbachev’s reforms the private entrepreneurships that could be 
counted as one of the significant signs of being a liberal economy were booming.
69
 
In the late 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, early examples of foreign trade 
and private banking followed this evolutionary path.
70
 Yeltsin was aware of the 
economic crisis that Russia experienced and supported a radical economic reform 
as quickly as possible after he became president. In the Yeltsin era, several reforms 
were conducted to convert the Russian economy into a capitalist economy from 
1992-1998.  
 Under Yeltsin, after the application for the GATT membership in June 
1993, the Memorandum of Foreign Trade Regime was submitted in 1994 in which 
Russia’s trade patterns, the economic reforms related to foreign trade, legal and 
institutional basis of Russian foreign trade and Russia’s currency system as of 
December 1993 were described in a detailed manner.
71
 Following the submission 
of this document and the establishment of the WP, the group met on 17-19 July 
1995, 4-6 December 1995, 30-31 May 1996, 15 October 1996, 15 April 1997, 22-
23 July 1997, 9-11 December 1997, 29 July 1998 and 16-17 December 1998.
72
 
Moreover, according to the submitted memorandum, in this term several 
legislational changes were completed on the way to transform the Russian 
economy and Table III shows some of these legal improvements of the Yeltsin 
era.
73
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 At the start of the Russian economic transformation, Yeltsin had applied 
for GATT membership by hoping that Russia would be a GATT member soon like 
the other East European countries, however the situation was different. While 
undergoing the WTO accession process during Yeltsin’s tenure, after some 
meetings of the WP, it was clear that the Russian accession would take time and 
the commitments were hard to realize in the short term. The first review for the 
Russian WTO accession was held in 1996 at the Singapore Ministerial Meeting 
and here it was pointed out that the acceding countries should be in harmony with 
the WTO rules and should come to the WP with meaningful commitments for the 
market access.
74
 This persistence should have been the result of the Russian 
statements in which it was declared that the WTO membership had an importance 
for Russia; however, the conditions would not be accepted by Russia.
75
 At the 
same event, Russia criticized the WTO accession process by pointing out that the 
WP demands were beyond the WTO obligations.
76
 
 The 1998 economic crisis discredited the Russian economic efforts in the 
eyes of the WTO. After the crisis, the Russian Trade Minister went to Geneva to 
convince WP members about the continuation of Russian attempts for being a 
market economy and asked them to continue tariff negotiations with Russia.
77
 The 
WP met in December 1998 but it was again clear that the WTO accession would 
not be so easy. After this event, the economy started its recovery slowly and in the 
economic program of 1999-2000, the Russian government rescheduled the debts 
that would be due in that period, declared the government’s plans for structural 
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reforms and emphasized its commitment to a liberalized regime and plans for the 
removal of the trade restrictions. The need to be a WTO member in order to cope 
with the market economy’s disadvantages was officially articulated in a statement 
on 13 July 1999 as: “to accelerate Russia's integration in the global economy, in 
1999, the government will continue negotiations toward WTO accession, and will 
ensure that any new trade restrictions would be fully consistent with WTO 
rules.”78  
 After the 1998 economic crisis, there was a common understanding that 
being a member of international organizations would strengthen the institutional 
capacity. Russian effort for being a WTO member in the following years was the 
reflection of this idea. In July 1999, the IMF approved standby credit for the 
Russian 1999-2000 economic program by referring to ongoing fiscal problems, 
lack of structural reform and Asia’s economic crisis as the reasons for the financial 
crash.
79
 
 In this era, the economic structure, which was needed before meeting the 
WTO requirements, such as privatization, stabilization and price liberalization 
were established. For instance, abolition of subsidies for grain used in flavor 
production, signing treaties with 23 different countries for encouraging and 
protecting the investments and removal of some goods from the quota list were 
achieved in the Yeltsin era and these acts also helped the Russian WTO accession 
process.
80
 All in all, every single issue under Yeltsin’s presidential terms that 
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aimed to transform the Russian centrally planned economy into a liberal market 
economy ultimately contributed to the Russian WTO membership. 
 
2.2.1 Reforms of the Gaidar Era (1991-1992) 
 The Gaidar era reforms provided the basis for transforming the Russian 
central economy a market economy with price liberalization and privatizations.  
Yeltsin’s strategy was to put the economy in the hands of the young economists. 
By including Gaidar’s ideas in his speeches, Yeltsin actually revealed his choice 
and in November, 1991 Gaidar was appointed as the Minister of Finance and 
Economy.
81
 In January 1992, the reform program was launched in which Gaidar 
had set mainly two aims: radical liberalization and stabilization.
82
 It was known by 
Yeltsin and Gaidar that the beginning of the reform operation would be drastic and 
cause a certain decrease in the living standards.
83
  
 In line with the programme, in the beginning of 1992, most prices were 
freed from administrative control and this was followed by the liberalizing of all 
trade activities.
84
 However, leaving energy prices out of the price liberalization and 
limiting internal trade flows affected consequences negatively.
85
 Balancing the 
state budget was another aim and this was attempted by large cuts in subsidies and 
military procurements.
86
 As a consequence of the reformist acts, an inflationary 
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wave on retail prices occurred and street traders emerged which in later stages 
created a fertile environment for organized economic crime.
87
  
 The way that Gaidar and his team decided to fight against the inflation was 
to limit the money supply, but this caused resistance from the parliament and the 
producers’ demand to increase the money supply gave rise to more inflation and 
external borrowing.
88
 At this stage, the first part of the privatization of the state 
properties was started and according to the data extracted from the book Kremlin 
Capitalism: Privatising the Russian economy by the end of 1992 “18 mid-sized 
and large companies, 46,797 small shops, 2,788,000 apartments and 182,787 farms 
have been privatized; 3,485 industrial enterprises have been leased.”89 Meanwhile, 
in July 1992, partial convertibility of ruble was introduced.
90
 
 The reform program and the team responsible for implementing the 
program were highly criticized from several aspects. The basic critique of the 
program was its assertion and ambition to transform such a huge and for many 
years’ communist country into a market economy in a really short time period.91 
Gaidar’s reform program also was accused of not being announced to or shared by 
the community before implementation.
92
 Furthermore, it was argued that even 
though the team was composed of really successful economists, they were elitist 
and distant from the public
93
 and their high reliance on neoclassical economists 
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prevented them from considering the realities of the Russian economy.
94
 In 
addition to these claims, Gaidar’s reform program was criticized for being 
implemented with the help of the foreign experts who did not deeply know the 
structure of the Russian economy.
95
 
 On the other hand, there were some counter arguments which defended the 
idea that when the conjuncture of the time was considered, Gaidar was not flexible 
in actions, “room for maneuver was extremely limited” and it was impossible to 
transform the Russian economy into a market economy with gradual reforms and 
shock therapy was necessary.
96
  
 
2.2.2 Reforms of the Chernomyrdin Era (1993-1995) 
 In the Chernomyrdin era, the continuation of privatizations and the end of 
the ruble zone were the important improvements that moved Russia closer to the 
WTO membership. Viktor Chernomyrdin was the former Minister of the Gas and 
Oil Industry and was known as a more conservative technocrat in comparison to 
Gaidar.
97
 However this change was not sufficient to stop the dissidents. On 3 
September 1993, the Parliament organized an uprising but this act was ended with 
the military attack by Yeltsin against the rebels.
98
 As a consequence of the event, 
the Parliament was dissolved and the new constitution and parliamentary elections 
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gave Yeltsin a chance to create an environment in which the reforms could easily 
continue.
99
 
       The new government continued privatization in which this time registered 
privatization accounts, in other words vouchers to involve more Russians in the 
process were used.
100
 Thus, at the end of 1993, 8,509 mid-size and large 
companies, 80,491 shops, 8,592,000 apartments and 270,000 family farms had 
been privatized.
101
 Meanwhile, in order to balance the state budget, in 
Chernomyrdin’s era the subsidies to ex-Soviet republics and allies were cut as well 
as the military and research program reductions.
102
  
 Furthermore, by September 1993, the ruble zone, which was seen as an 
obstacle for monetary policy, was ended.
103
 In the same year, the Russian 
government started internal borrowing by issuing government short term bonds 
(GKOs).
104
 However, even though there were some attempts for stabilization of 
the economy, the currency crisis, known as “Black Tuesday”, occurred on 11 
October 1994 and resulted with the depreciation of ruble by about 25% against the 
US dollar in a day, which caused panic among the people and revealed the fragility 
of the Russian economy.
105
 Following this economic shock, the first standby 
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agreement between Russia and the IMF was signed and the agreement included 
$6.8 billion financing in one year.
106
 
 When the time for the presidential elections of 1996 came close, Yeltsin 
and his team had already started their election campaign in which they promised to 
pay all the wages in arrears to the workers and to promote the achievements of 
former reforms.
107
 In spring 1996, Russia concluded a three year loan program 
with the IMF which assured somehow the reelection of Yeltsin in the upcoming 
elections but on the other hand harmed the economic policy.
108
 In July 1996, 
Russia had already decided to continue with Yeltsin, but there were some changes 
in the government such as Potanin was appointed as the Minister of Economic 
Affairs but, this position was soon filled in 1997 with Chubais.
109
 
 
2.2.2.1 Rise of the Oligarchs (1995-1996) and Their Role in Decision Making 
in Russia 
 In 1995, a special program was conducted under the name of “loans for 
shares” in which the Russian government put up some of assets for sale and the 
cabinet approved a plan through which a kind of consortium of seven banks would 
loan some amount of money to the government to cover the budget deficit.
110
 
However, even though the auctions took place, it was later revealed that the banks 
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did not have sufficient funds to loan the government the amount that was 
promised.
111
  
 The usage of the word oligarch coincides more or less with the “loans for 
shares” program. Applying this word to the big businessmen in Russia who owned 
the large Russian banks or oil firms, had a wide network and became rich through 
buying privatization vouchers beyond measure could be understood.
112
 The 
relationship between the Yeltsin government and the oligarchs of the time, who 
became stronger after the loans for share program, was consolidated by the 1996 
election in which the oligarchs supported Yeltsin against his communist rival with 
the intention of guaranteeing their own future positions in the economy. The 
oligarchs worked to have Yeltsin reelected as president by using media effectively 
and with the help of their wide network.
113
  
 The economic power of the oligarchs easily transformed into a political 
power. The opposition of the oligarchs towards the Russian WTO membership in 
order to protect their economic interests in their sectors far too much affected the 
state of affairs on the Russian WTO accession process. For instance, the 
opposition of Oleg Deripaska in automobile sector was an important obstacle for 
the Russian government on the way to its WTO membership negotiations.   
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2.2.3 Reforms of the Chubais Era (1997-1998) 
 Chubais, together with Boris Nemtsov who was appointed as the deputy 
premier, were the responsible people for the Russian economy in 1997 and 1998 
and their main aim was a stabilized economy.
114
 Their first task was to pay all 
wages in arrears to the workers, as had been promised before the elections. The 
election campaign promise of Yeltsin caused an increase in a consolidated budget 
expenditure which affected the government’s finance system negatively.115  
 They also forced some large companies to pay their tax debts, as in this 
manner it was planned to increase the revenue for the state budget.
116
 Privatization 
of the state enterprises continued in this term and ongoing competition between the 
oligarchs was strengthened with the auction of a Russian telecommunication giant 
company. A major oligarch Berezovski was disappointed when two other oligarchs 
of the time entered into the auction and gained more as opposed to his quasi deal 
with Chubais regarding the auction.
117
 As a consequence of this event, Berezovski 
used his media channels to scandalize the auction as well as Chubais’ position.118 
The event was called a bankers’ war and continued until the 1998 financial crisis. 
As a result, the government lost favor. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
RUSSIAN WTO ACCESSION COMMITMENTS AND THE 
POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF THE COMMITMENTS ON THE 
RUSSIAN SECTORS 
 
 
 
 Russia is the largest country in the world by its area, has a large population 
and consists of several different geographical and climatic regions. This feature 
gives Russia an advantage in terms of the diversity in economic resources. Russian 
economic components are vast natural resources such as coal, oil, gas and forests; 
industrial powers such as manufacturing; human resources and capital resources. 
The management of these resources carries utmost importance because when they 
are all used at full efficiency, there will be an immense economic yield for Russian 
prosperity.  
 Russian WTO membership commitments almost touched upon all these 
economic dynamics, which made Russia much more attentive about searching for 
the right time and atmosphere for the Russian WTO accession. Through the 
membership, there were some sectors that would be harmed or gain and there were 
some kinds of changes in the short term different than the long term. Therefore 
examining the strengths and weaknesses of the Russian economic sectors, the 
37 
 
commitments that Russia gave for the WTO accession and the possible effects of 
these commitments on the Russian sectors is crucial. In addition to this, how the 
WTO accession process could not be concluded due to the burden of technical 
commitments in years 2003 and 2007 during Putin’s first and second presidential 
terms will be explored.   
 
3.1 Russian WTO Commitments 
 In order to be a WTO member, Russia had to comply with all WTO 
agreements including GATT, General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), 
TRIMs and TRIPs. The commitments included non-discriminatory treatment of 
imported goods and services, reducing tariff levels, ensuring transparency in trade, 
limiting agricultural subsidies, enforcing IPRs in trade and opening government 
procurement contracts to foreign firms. In addition to these commitments, Russia 
had to accept the WTO dispute settlement procedures in order to be a WTO 
member.   
 
3.1.1 Manufactured Goods 
 Manufacturing in Russia was an important alternative sector when the huge 
amount of hydrocarbon production was considered. However, the share of 
manufacturing in the Russian economy was less compared to natural resources. 
For instance, in 2010, the share of manufactured goods in export was less than 
38 
 
15% whereas the share of fuels in the Russian export was almost 65%.
119
 Russian 
commitment in manufactured goods was to reduce the tariff rate to around 7.3% in 
a specific time limit, which set differently for each sector, and eliminate all 
industrial subsidies.
120
 
 The most important part of the manufacturing in Russia was machine 
building including locomotives, automobiles, agricultural machinery, space 
vehicles, military weapons, and computers. A strong objection towards the Russian 
WTO membership had come from automobile sector because the fall in import 
duties of automobiles would put the Russian automobile industry into a 
disadvantaged position due to the need for competition with the global firms. 
Especially in automobile and aircraft sectors, Oleg Deripaska, who was an 
important Russian businessman, stood against the Russian accession. Ultimately, 
he was successful in achieving high protection on imported used cars.
121
 However, 
according to the commitments of Russia, the decrease in tariff rates would need to 
be fulfilled in a seven year period. It was perceived by the WTO that seven years 
was enough for a sector to modernize and make itself ready to compete with the 
global standards. 
   In non-ferrous metal production such as aluminium, nickel and copper, 
Russia was one of the best in the world. As opposed to automobile and aviation 
sectors, chemical and ferrous and non-ferrous metals sectors would be the 
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lucrative sectors and would gain with the removal of high tariffs on Russian 
exports.
122
 
 In brief, with the reduction in tariffs, the machine building sector would 
become vulnerable. This situation required more careful negotiations, especially in 
terms of setting the time limit after which the tariff rates would be implemented in 
order to give the sector the chance to make the necessary preparations and changes 
in order to compete with the foreign firms. However, the gains in chemicals, 
metals and minerals sectors were expected to be felt instantly. 
 
3.1.2 Agricultural Goods 
 Agriculture was one of the most affected sectors during the economic 
transition with more than a 50% decline in agricultural production between the 
years 1991-1996.
123
 The cuts in large subsidies in the agriculture sector was the 
most salient reason for the sector’s suffering because before the liberalization of 
the Russian market, the agriculture sector was receiving large amounts of grants by 
way of budget subsidies and price policies.
124
  
 The livestock sector was also affected negatively during the transition years 
along with the agriculture sector. The contraction in this sector increased 
agriculture and meat imports and Russia could concentrate on grain export rather 
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than importing animal feed products.
125
 In the 2000s, the agriculture sector’s grain 
production highly increased as well as the livestock sector’s poultry production but 
still Russia became the second importer of agricultural goods
126
 among the 
emerging markets following China.
127
 
 Agricultural issues were the most controversial ones in the Russian WTO 
accession process. Russia was applying high tariffs and tariff quotas (TRQs) 
 
for 
beef, pork, poultry and whey products
128
 and also sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) 
measures with the protectionist aims.
129
 In addition to these kinds of practices, 
there also was the agricultural subsidy issue to be solved in front of the Russian 
WTO membership which Russia was committed to reduce to $4.4 billion by 
2018.
130
 
 In tariff reduction, it was expected from Russia to lower the tariff rate such 
as for dairy products to 14.9%, cereals to 10%, wood and paper to 8%, oilseeds 
and fats and oils to 7.1% and cotton to 0%.
131
 With regard to the randomly applied 
SPS measures, Russia was obliged to comply with the WTO SPS Agreement, 
which prevents WTO members from using such control measures to protect their 
own economies.
132
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 For more than one third of the products, the implementation of the final 
bound tariff rates was the accession date whereas for one quarter of the 
commitment areas it was three years.
133
 Additionally, Russia was applying export 
duties on raw mineral materials, metals and some fertilizers but had a commitment 
to eliminate that by the time of accession.
134
 
 The Russian negotiations on agricultural goods were the most complex in 
the process, because even though the WTO members were totally against the 
agricultural subsidy, Russia resisted abolishing this application quickly. 
Furthermore, Russian persistence on tariff quotas for meat imports and SPS 
measures sometimes put the process in a deadlock. Russian political use of these 
tools as a threat towards the WTO members, for instance in 2008 when Putin 
declared that some agreements for the WTO membership about red meat and 
poultry would be suspended until the accession, was not welcomed.  
 
3.1.3 Services 
 Russia made some commitments in the services sector within the 
framework of GATS in order to allow the foreigner service suppliers to enter 
Russia and either invest in these service sectors or acquire services without 
discrimination. Russian Federation’s commitments were in 11 service and 116 
sub-service sectors.
135
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 The finance system was the sector which changed faster than the others in 
the transition period. As the financial intermediaries, there were two different 
groups of banks within the economy, which were private banks and commercial 
banks.
136
 In terms of banking sector ownership, in Russia the shares of the public 
sector and national private sector were almost equal whereas in terms of the share 
of the foreign private sector, Russia was in competition with Vietnam and China 
by holding a small foreign capital share.
137
  
 Russian commitments about the banking and insurance sectors were related 
to giving the right of 100% foreign ownership to non-life insurance companies and 
banks with the WTO membership.
138
 The development of the Russian banking and 
insurance systems had occurred after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and that 
was why they were immature. Therefore, Russian officials had the idea that these 
sectors were an “infant industry”139 and should be protected before letting them 
compete with foreigners.
140
 However, with the WTO commitment of Russia, the 
sectors were opening to foreign competition. The commitments in 
telecommunications, business services and distribution sectors also were including 
the allowance of 100% foreign ownership.
141
 
 The WTO negotiations of the services such as financing and 
telecommunications were challenging because of the importance of these sectors 
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for the national economic security. Russia had committed itself to achieve major 
concessions in the banking and financial sectors. For this reason, Russia insisted 
on the protection of national limitations in these sectors throughout the WTO 
accession process, yet the need to open this market to foreign investors was 
understood.
142
  
 
3.1.4 Intellectual Property Rights 
 Russia was highly criticized due to the lack of IPRs protection. Within the 
framework of TRIPs Agreement, Russia committed to increase the actions against 
trademark counterfeiting and copyright piracy, to find the companies and web-sites 
in which illegal distribution of objects that should be protected by copyright were 
conducted and to reinforce border protection.
143
  
 The IPRs issue was one of the problems for the WTO members because 
Russia was not able to guarantee that the traders would conform to the IPRs rules 
and Russian declarations in line with TRIPs were not satisfactory. By the US 
representative, it was stated that the US wanted to observe “on the ground results” 
in the IPRs area.
144
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3.1.5 Trade Related Investment Measures  
 The TRIMs Agreement aims is to dissuade a country from putting 
restrictions on FDIs, to prohibit the domestic firms clustering around where wide 
natural resources existed and to allow foreign companies to benefit from these 
resources.
145
 Russia had commitments for complying with TRIMs. 
 During Russia’s transition years, the FDIs were low due to organized 
crime, regulatory problems of investing into the country and common illegality.
146
 
Although Russia had rich natural resources and cheap and qualified human capital, 
it was a risk for the businessmen to invest in Russia. However, between the years 
1994-1998, following the transition attempts, an increase was experienced in the 
FDIs to the region even though with the 1998 economic crisis, there was a 
decrease again.
147
 At the beginning of 2000, the net cumulative inflow coming 
from the FDIs was really low for Russia compared to other transition countries and 
most of the FDIs was concentrated in especially Moscow and St. Petersburg 
regions.
148
  
 It was estimated that with the WTO accession, Russia would gain $53 
billion per year in the medium term and in the long term, this number would 
increase $177 billion per year as a result of the fulfillment of the commitments 
related to TRIMs.
149
 The Russian transformation into a more transparent and safer 
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place for the investors was mostly for the benefit of the US and the EU. Besides 
Russia, former Soviet Union countries also were attractive investment locations.
150
  
 Russia had some problems on the way to the WTO accession process due 
to the program aiming to increase the domestic automobile production which also 
was highly criticized by the US and the EU. As a consequence, Russia committed 
to finish the program by 2018 and because the EU’s economy was mostly affected 
by this application, Russia committed to rectify the harmful impact on the EU 
automobile parts exporters.
151
 
 
3.1.6 Other Commitments 
 Russia committed to fix export duties for over 700 tariff lines, to eliminate 
quantitative restrictions on imports such as licensing and quotas, to apply the 
Customs Union Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) system for the 
developing and least developed countries, to apply WTO rules in a same manner in 
all over the country without exceptions and to publish all legislation and to make it 
accessible.
152
  
 The export duty became problematic on the way to the Russian WTO 
membership. Russia’s export duty on raw timber made the Russian timber 
producers more advantageous as opposed to the EU producers, especially Finland 
and Sweden. However, the problem was solved during the process.
153
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 One of the other commitments was Russian seizure of subsidized natural 
gas for domestic firms in order to prevent the unfair benefit but the Russian 
government held the right to subsidize non-commercial matters related to natural 
gas.
154
 Another of Russia’s commitments was signing the WTO Government 
Procurement Agreement even though it was not a prerequisite for the WTO 
membership and Russia would be in compliance with the requirements of the 
agreement four years after the accession.
155
  
 Russian integration with the world market economy was being achieved 
through the fulfillment of the WTO commitments. The commitments covered 
myriad economic aspects and affected several sectors both negatively and 
positively. 
  
3.2 US Interest in the Russian WTO Membership 
 The US government had supported the WTO accession of the Russian 
Federation. The cooperation between the US and Russia for the Russian 
membership process was evaluated as a “policy aimed to overcome mutual distrust 
due to 2003 Iraq war, UN ambitions for NATO enlargement and Russian 
accusations of US unilateralism.”156 It was anticipated that with the Russian WTO 
membership, the relations between the US and Russia would be more stable, 
predictable and transparent. Even though Russia was not a major trade partner of 
the US, as one of the largest oil producers, Russian ability to manipulate oil prices 
was affecting the US consumers. Furthermore, there was an expectation about an 
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increase in trade volume among these countries.
157
 The sectors of the US that 
would benefit much from the Russian WTO accession were: “agriculture, meat 
and poultry producers; manufacturers, information technology; and a range of 
services from finance to education.”158 
 However, there was a technical obstacle that was blocking the 
improvement of the trust relationship between the US and Russia which was the 
Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the US Trade Act of 1974 because Title IV of this 
act limited permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) with the countries that were 
non-market economies and had restrictive emigration policies.
159
 Even though in 
1994, Russia had gained normal trade relations (NTR) that offered the same 
benefits but were required to be renewed every year, because the WTO 
necessitates unconditional and immediate MFN treatment towards the WTO 
members, the US would not be in accord with the WTO rule as long as the US did 
not give Russia the PNTR status.
160
 
 
3.2.1 Russian-US Bilateral Agreement for the Russian WTO Accession 
 As opposed to Putin’s negative rhetoric towards the end of his second 
presidential term, the signing of the bilateral agreement on 18 November 2006 
with the US, which was the largest and most effective country within the 
organization, was an important development in the Russian WTO membership 
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process. The US Trade Representative Susan Schwab was of the belief that this 
agreement “will mark an important step in Russia attaining membership in the 
WTO.”161 Similarly, the president of the American Chamber of Commerce in 
Moscow Andrew Somers described the agreement as a "major positive milestone 
in relations between our two countries."
162
 
 One of the primary goals of the US in this agreement was related to banks 
and insurance issues because after Russia recovered its economy and repaid all the 
IMF debt, there no longer was a threat for foreign money in Russian economics as 
Sutela states: “The road was now open to private and quasi-public entities, large 
companies and banks, to acquire foreign finance."
163
 In addition to the banking and 
insurance sectors, with this bilateral agreement, US service suppliers would have 
more chance in telecommunications, computer and related services, express 
delivery, distribution and audio-visual services.
164
 
 Furthermore, Russia accepted in this agreement to “grant US regulatory 
officials of the Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS), the authority to certify 
new US establishments that have remedied a deficiency to export meat and poultry 
to Russia.”165 This was the case in 2003 when Russia had blocked the US poultry 
as retaliation against the US ban on steel. Via this agreement, the US wanted to 
secure its poultry market from random acts of the Russian Federation. However, 
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by giving the right to US exports of chicken, pork and beef to access the Russian 
market, “Putin had evidently overruled his Minister of Agriculture Gordeyev.”166 
In addition to the US farmers, who would benefit from market access provisions of 
the agreement, Russia agreed to participate in the Information Technology 
Agreement (ITA) through which computers and semiconductors could enter the 
country duty free.
167
 
 There were also IPRs issues regulated with this agreement. Both 
governments agreed to a binding action plan against piracy and counterfeiting for 
the improvement and protection of IPRs.
168
 Moreover, reduction of tariffs on 
chemical products, construction, agricultural and scientific equipment; reduction 
of export duties on steel scrap; elimination of export duty on copper cathode, and 
ease in the export of products with encryption were some other benefits afforded to 
the US traders.
169
 
 
3.3 EU Interest in the Russian WTO Membership 
 Along with the Russian WTO accession attempts, there were some 
important agreements between Russia and the EU. For instance, Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement (PCA), which was signed in 1994 and came into force in 
1997, was the basis for the relations among these nations and this agreement 
covered a wide range of areas from political dialogue and trade in goods and 
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services to training and cooperation in nuclear technology.
170
  Furthermore, with 
this agreement, Russia had gained MFN status with exceptions on the export of 
certain steel products.
171
 Russian-EU relations had been improved in the 
framework of PCA in 2003 at the St. Petersburg Summit by deciding to create four 
common spaces and Common Economic Space (CES) was one of them with the 
aim of removing the trade barriers among these countries.
172
 
 While Russian-EU economic relations were developing in such a positive 
way, the effects were seen in the EU support of the Russian WTO accession as 
well. The EU was strongly supportive of the Russian WTO accession because 
Russia was the biggest natural gas supplier of the EU as well as being an important 
trade partner with its natural resources along with the US and China. Moreover, for 
Russia, the EU was important because the important percentage of the FDIs in 
Russia was coming from the EU and the EU was the source of manufactures 
import.
 173
 
 The WTO accession of Russia would not change the volume of EU imports 
from Russia because energy was the main import material whereas there might be 
an increase in the import of steel, ferrous and nonferrous materials and some basic 
chemicals from Russia to the EU.
174
 However, with the WTO membership, Russia 
would no longer easily impose high tariffs or quotas and thus EU would gain an 
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advantage to enter into the Russian market in services, agriculture, mechanical 
engineering, textile and clothing.
175
  
 One of the other important interests of the EU in the Russian WTO 
membership was related to the Kyoto Protocol. The EU bid in the 2004 EU-Russia 
Summit was to support the Russian WTO accession in return for the Russian 
Kyoto Protocol ratification. Whether or not the Russian Kyoto Protocol was a 
consequence of this deal between the EU and Russia, the adoption of the protocol 
in a country where the environmental problems were not one of the attractive 
issues in politics and in the eyes of public was remarkable.
176
 
 
3.3.1 Russian-EU Bilateral Agreement for the Russian WTO Accession 
 On 21 May 2004, the EU and Russia had signed the bilateral negotiation 
for the Russian WTO accession and European Commission President Romano 
Prodi had indicated the importance of the day as: "Today the EU and Russia 
cement further their trade and economic relations. This deal brings Russia a step 
closer to the international trade family, the World Trade Organization, where it 
belongs."
177
 This agreement covered the commitments that Russia had promised to 
undertake when Russia acceded to the WTO. However, importantly, through this 
agreement the trade related energy question about Russian gas prices to local 
industries were regulated and it was concluded that the gas prices would increase 
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gradually for local industry as a consequence of the EU giving up its aim to end 
Gazprom’s export monopoly.178  
 Moreover, there was one more achievement area of the EU through this 
agreement, which was the services trade such as transportation, telecommunication 
and construction services. There was an increase expected in the quota set for the 
foreign capital in the banking and insurance sectors in addition to the Russian 
agreement on the dismantling of the Rostelekom monopoly in the communication 
sector.
179
 
 
3.4 The Effect of the Commitments on the Russian WTO Accession Process 
 In order to be a WTO member, Russia had to comply with all WTO 
agreements including GATT, GATS, TRIMs and TRIPs. However, Russia did 
more than comply with these agreements through 30 bilateral agreements related 
to market access of services and 57 agreements for market access of goods.
180
 It 
was a fruitful process for Russia to harmonize its applications with the world trade 
criteria.  
 The Russian WTO accession experience was different than the others 
because the Russian fuel dependent economy, communist background, historical 
roles in the international arena, and responsibilities to the former Soviet countries 
made the process more complicated and extended. Russian efforts for adopting 
world standards were praiseworthy, even though due to the extension of the 
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accession procedure and tedious harmonization agenda sometimes there was a 
decrease in the motivation of Russian leaders and technocrats.  
 The Russian 2003 and 2007 accession failures mostly were related to the 
burden of Russia’s commitments in goods, services, intellectual property and 
investments. Furthermore, the commitments were increasing with the accession of 
each new WTO member to the WP and with their demands for bilateral 
agreements from Russia. Before Putin, the concentration in the economy was more 
on the building up of the market economy institutions and trying to make it run 
somehow, whereas starting from Putin’s presidential term it was time to make 
second generation reforms, or in other words fine tunings to the economy via the 
trade commitments. The year 2003 was early for Russia to fully adopt the market 
economy principles and fulfill all the obligations and enter into the WTO. In 2007, 
even though the future agenda in front of Russia was internalized, there still were 
some sectors in which Russia could not estimate the possible effects and the 
necessary precautions to protect those sectors from harm. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
ECONOMIC POLICY OF PUTIN ERA AND THE RUSSIAN 
WTO ACCESSION FAILURES UNDER PUTIN’S FIRST AND 
SECOND PRESIDENTIAL TERMS 
 
 
 
 Putin was appointed as the Prime Minister on 9 August 1999 by Yeltsin. 
He was lucky because under his presidential terms, the fruits of the institutional 
and structural changes of the 1980s and 1990s could be collected and the oil boom 
of the 2000s underpinned an inestimable economic revival. With huge public 
support, during his eight year presidency he pursued assertive political and 
economic policies. During this term, the Russian economy both grew and 
stabilized in economic terms until the 2008 crisis.  
 Moreover, this era was different than the Yeltsin presidency because it was 
believed that being a member of the WTO as the leading organization for 
international trade was crucial as the “possible external anchor for Russian 
reforms.”181 Therefore, there is need to examine the events of the Putin era which 
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had an effect on the Russian economic policy and the reform packages of the time 
to search for the clues to answer why Russia could not be a member of the WTO in 
2003 and 2007 as it was aimed under Putin’s tenure. 
 
4.1 Putin’s Economic Policy 
 During the 1990s, Russia had become a market economy even though not a 
full-fledged one with economic transitions occurring in the market, legally 
independent market institutions and without a centrally governed economy.
182
 The 
economy, which was a total disaster after the 1998 crisis, started to grow at an 
average rate of 7%, between the years 2002-2008 imports grew nearly five times, 
between 1998-2008 oil price increased fifteen times, from 2002 to 2008 the current 
account surplus increased to approximately $70 billion and from 2000 to 2007 the 
federal budget surplus increased from 1.5% of GDP to 5.5%.
183
 In the mid-1990s, 
there were no central bank reserves, but by the mid-2000s, Russia ranked third 
globally in terms of central bank reserves.
184
 
 When Putin came to power, the Russian economy was a hybrid type 
because on the one hand some industries were getting more profitable, the non-
payment crisis had ended and tax revenues had increased, yet, on the other hand, 
Russia still lacked some capitalist structures such as banks and stock markets.
185
 
However, with the help of the oil boom during Putin’s presidential terms, real 
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capital markets were established, stock markets grew, the banking system revived, 
consumer spending jumped and productivity increased.  
 Even though Putin had started his first presidential term with efficient 
reforms for being a more transparent market economy such as customs and tax 
reforms, the oil boom and related economic improvements affected his 
concentration about reforms for creating a running market economy in a negative 
way. According to Aslund, in his second term, Putin starting with the confiscation 
of Yukos Company halted the reforms, opted for re-nationalization, tolerated 
corruption and increased cooperation with the oligarchs who were mostly the 
former KGB officers.
186
 
 There were several reasons for the arrest of Khodorkovski, the Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO) of Yukos Company, but the most remarkable ones were 
Khodorkovski’s obvious political ambition that Putin perceived as a threat, the 
oppression from siloviki
187
 and the government strategy to increase state control 
over the oil sector.
188
 Whatever the reason, the result of the attack on Yukos was 
distrust of the Russian economic reforms and negative effect on oil prices and 
investments.
189
 The Yukos Affair not only affected the Russian economy but also 
others, such as “the total of US investors’ losses was as high as $6.7 billion.”190 
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 In Putin’s era there were two competing powers in Russia which were the 
siloviki and the liberals.
191
 Putin tried to reach a balance among them, namely 
while he was protecting the Russian weak spots against the West, at the same time 
he was trying to obtain benefit from the Western modern technology and make 
Russia powerful to compete with the world.
192
 However, it was more the situation 
that Putin tightened control over the economy, politics and social life which could 
be considered as over-managed democracy rather than enhancing the liberal and 
democratic ideas which were announced in the Yeltsin era.
193
 
 In consequence, Putin’s economic policy moves directly affected the 
Russian WTO accession process as well. There is a report by the American 
Enterprise Institue that highlights the relationship between the oil power of Russia 
and its assertive foreign policy by studying 86 events in Russian policy between 
the years 2000-2007. The report concludes that “The more valuable oil became, 
the more hostile Russian foreign policy became.
194
 The reverse also was true: 
when oil prices dropped in 2001 and 2002, so did Russia’s aggression.”195 As an 
important proof of the report, the Russian WTO accession motivation can be 
shown. Russia was more focused on its membership and believed very much in the 
importance of accession in Putin’s first term. Yet, in the second term in which the 
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economy took off, the tendency changed in the opposite way and Putin’s speeches 
in his second term were totally different than his first term speeches.  
 
4.2 Putin’s First Presidential Term (2000-2004) 
 When Putin first came to power, he declared his will to continue economic 
reforms and during his presidency he tried to balance the oligarchy with the liberal 
market necessities of the country. Putin’s first term was crucial in terms of his 
dedication and efforts for the Russian WTO accession, especially with the help of 
Gref, Putin’s Minister of Economic Development and Trade and Chief Trade 
Negotiator Maxim Medvedkov. In his annual speech in 2002, he was attracting 
attention to the issue that Russia still was out of the world economy’s decision 
making process and he was describing the WTO as “not an absolute evil and not 
an absolute good. And it is not an award for good behavior. The WTO is a tool. 
Those who know how to use it become stronger.”196  
 One of Putin’s aims in his first presidency was having Russia become a 
member of the WTO by the end of 2003, but that aim could not be achieved due to 
technical reasons.
197
 The consensus decision-making rule of the WTO and the 
requirement to conclude vast bilateral and multilateral accession negotiations with 
the requested WTO members as well as the fulfillment of the commitments were 
the reasons that extended the Russian WTO accession process. The planned date 
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was early for Russia to fulfill all the requirements and finalize the agreements with 
several countries in the WP, even though there was political will. On the other 
hand, the term was useful for Russia to learn about the market economy 
necessities. By 2003, general awareness about the Russian WTO accession was 
hardly created among the public and politicians because the accession was not 
possible without being conscious about the advantages and disadvantages of the 
membership from the tradesmen’s point of view as well as from the governmental 
perspective. 
 Starting from the beginning of his first presidential term, Putin gave 
priority to the Russian WTO accession. There could be four reasons of why WTO 
membership gained popularity both in political and public spheres in this era. They 
were the matured intellectual base for the trade related issues, changing Russian 
economic structure, China’s 2011 WTO accession and Russia’s international 
prestige.  
 Under Putin’s presidency, the Russian economists and economic politicians 
made the Russian WTO accession issue a state policy because the advantages of 
the WTO membership for the Russian tradesmen were realized.
198
 Intensive 
informative workshops for businesses and regional administrations throughout 
Russia between 2001 and 2005 also were praiseworthy in terms of increasing the 
awareness of the public regarding the WTO.
199
  
 Secondly, the economic operators were more interested in the Russian 
WTO membership when the nature of the Russian economy started to change in 
                                                          
198
 Aslund, “Russia’s WTO Accession.”  
199
 Alexey Portanskiy, WTO Press Releases (2005): 2. 
60 
 
the direction from raw materials to intermediary goods export such as metals and 
chemicals.
200
 In addition to the sectors which were planning to benefit from the 
WTO membership, other sectors such as aluminium, agriculture, aviation and car 
manufacturing and services also were interested in the Russian WTO accession 
policies because there was something at stake to defend against the Russian WTO 
membership.
201
 
 Another reason which made WTO issues gain popularity in Russia was 
China’s 2011 WTO accession, which came after 15 years of negotiations. China’s 
accession was welcomed by the world economy and Russia was left as the biggest 
economy outside the WTO. Actually, as Russia and China shared a communist 
history, China’s accession motivated Putin’s WTO membership efforts in these 
years.  
 Apart from these causes, the WTO was covering approximately 96% of the 
world economies, but Russia was left as the largest economy outside the 
organization.
202
 This situation created a political subordination and loss of prestige 
and Putin could not stay indifferent to such a situation. Therefore, the WTO 
accession became a kind of matter of pride for Putin. 
 
4.2.1 Reforms in Putin’s First Presidential Term 
 In this presidential term, Putin dealt with important issues such as tax and 
customs laws because corruption in Russia and the weak legal basis were the most 
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criticized areas for fully being a market economy and for the WTO membership. 
For these reforms, the Gref Plan had been adopted in 2000;
203
 however, the 
attempts were not enough for the WTO accession as long as a strong and effective 
system for the application of these rules in practice was not established.  
 
4.2.1.1 Tax Reform 
 The tax reform was important in order to ensure a sustainable budget and to 
reinforce an investment climate.
204
 These were the important criteria that the WTO 
was searching for in a WTO member country. The first part of the tax code had 
been prepared and put into force in 1999 under Yeltsin’s presidency and the 
second part of the code, which came into force in Putin’s presidency in 2001, dealt 
with mainly the personal income tax, excise taxes and mineral resource recovery 
tax.
205
 
 The reform on personal income tax, which included the reduction of the 
rate to 13%, and making it a flat rate rather than a progressive rate was introduced 
in Russia in January 2001.
206
 As a consequence of this reform, the real revenue 
gathered from personal income rates had been increased by approximately 26%.
207
 
This reform was important in terms of protecting the Russian economy from tax 
evasion because high personal income taxes were in most cases affecting the 
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economy in a negative way, especially in emerging markets.
208
 In addition to 
personal income tax, excise taxes on alcohol and tobacco as well as energy exports 
had been increased.
209
 
 The reform aimed to make the tax system fair, to decrease the tax burden 
on taxpayers, and to make the tax system simple, predictable and stable as well as 
easy to collect.
210
 After the tax reform of 2001, what should have been completed 
was the integration of the Russian tax system with the global tax system through 
agreements on double taxation with the other countries and being against 
international tax evasion.
211
 In conclusion, the tax reform had made Russia much 
closer to the WTO requirements and was one of Putin’s achievements for the 
WTO accession.   
 
4.2.1.2 Customs Reform 
 The customs role on trade is undeniable. Especially in recent years with the 
increased attention to supply-chain security, customs gained more importance in 
trade facilitation and security. Therefore, the modernization of customs within the 
framework of the WTO standards was an important step for being a running 
market economy. Furthermore, when the fiscal role of the customs was taken into 
consideration, the positive impact of the customs reform on the government 
revenue was unquestionable. Efficient, transparent and flowing customs were 
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important for the development of modern business and increase in FDIs as well as 
reducing transaction costs, namely for the benefit of economic operators. 
 The new Customs Code of the Russian Federation entered into force in 
January 2004 and through this reform, the national legislation was prepared in line 
with the WTO requirements.
212
 In the development of the Russian customs, the 
contributions of the World Bank also are worth mentioning. In order to achieve the 
uniform application of the new code and increase in taxpayers’ compliance, Russia 
received a $140 million loan under the “Customs Development Project.”213 Some 
of the aims of the new code were “to eliminate excessive administrative 
retsrictions on foreign trade and to establish clear and consistent rules for 
economic operators with regard to transborder movement of goods.”214 Namely, 
Russian customs had gained a standard through the code which was in line with 
the WTO requirements and based on the Revised Kyoto Convention under Putin’s 
presidency. 
 
4.2.1.3 Other reforms 
 Putin was not content with the loosely controlled regional leaders because 
it was the idea that their decisions were mostly contradictory to the center in terms 
of legislation and the local leaders were trying to find a way to not to contribute to 
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the federal budget.
215
 Therefore, in his first presidential term, Putin made some 
important reforms on the way to increasing the political effectiveness of the local 
administrations; as a consequence, political and administrative centralization was 
revived.
216
 For this aim, Putin established seven supra-regional districts that would 
be led by presidential appointees, undermined regional representation in the Duma, 
merged some regions and replaced regional elections, appointed local governors 
from Moscow and created vertical power.
217
  
 Moreover, because the media was taken under control as quickly as 
possible after Putin came to power, the electoral competition had become more 
difficult. In addition to this fact, it was made much harder to form or register for a 
political party, which ultimately resulted with the reduced number of parties in the 
Duma.
218
 
 There were some more reforms in the Gref Plan such as those related to 
monopolies and the pension system. For instance, the majority state-owned 
electricity company United Energy Systems (UES) was declared as under reform 
in 2001 and it took almost 10 years to liberalize the electricity market with all its 
components.
219
 The reform related to the gas sector also was discussed, but the 
action did not come in this period. Similar to the gas sector, the reform idea related 
to Russia’s railway sector also took time to be materialized. 
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 The Soviet-era insurance system was insufficient for the Russian 
Federation. There also was the need for pension reform. Under the Gref Plan, 
Russia adopted three pillars based on the World Bank model of social pension.
220
 
Apart from the pension reform, a new law on licensing came into force which 
shortened the time for having licenses by reducing the procedures.
221
 
 
4.2.2 Russian WTO Accession Failure of 2003 
 By the end of 2003, it was expected by the WTO and strong WTO 
members such as the US and the EU that Russia would be a WTO member. In 
2001, the very first draft of the WP Report on the Accession of the Russian 
Federation to the World Trade Organization was prepared and circulated in the 
WTO, which was a kind of proof to show how much improvement the Russian 
Federation had achieved on the WTO membership since the submission of 
memorandum.
222
 WTO Director General Mike Moore was so hopeful about 
Russian WTO membership by 2003 that he declared at the 5
th
 Annual Russian 
Economic Forum in London in April 2002 Russia had entered into “the decisive 
and final phase” through the first draft WP report and Moore ended his speech by 
stating that, “It will be a great failure of leadership if this accession is not 
completed in time for the Mexico Ministerial next year.”223  
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 In addition to the WTO, at the Russian-European Union Summit in 2002, 
the EU was appreciating the improvements by Russia on the way to liberalizing its 
economy as well as supporting the early Russian WTO accession. At that time the 
EU declared that it would change its legislation in order to give Russia market 
economy status.
224
  
 The Russian WTO membership was also strongly supported by the US, 
especially after the relations among the US and Russia was closer following the 
9/11 events. Putin was the first leader who called Bush to express his sorrow for 
the tragic event and his support to the US in its fight against terrorism.
225
 In 2001, 
the US Ambassador to the Russian Federation Alexander Vershbow declared the 
WP goal as submitting the first draft of accession protocol for Russia in 2002.
226
 
He drew attention to the point that the Russian commitments to the internationally 
set rules was the most important part for achieving the WTO membership by 
stating that, “What Russia will need to do is to fully accept the rules-based system 
governing international trade that the WTO represents, and offer improved market 
access for other countries' firms and products.”227 Furthermore, similar to the EU, 
it was stated that the US had also recognized Russia as a market economy in 2002 
and this decision was applauded especially by the Russian steel makers.
228
  
 In terms of political will, there was nothing lacking in Putin’s first term. 
Yet, for the WTO membership, political support and consensus was not decisive 
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on the countries’ accession as Moore states: “Even though very strongly politically 
supported, Russia's accession to the WTO cannot be concluded on a purely 
political basis.”229 However, it also was obvious that even though the topics were 
so technical, because the consequences were directly related to the trade 
liberalization, a political aspect unavoidably occurred.
230
  
 There were, of course, some problems in the accession process; however, 
they were not significant enough to block the membership. For instance, in 2002, 
Russian attempts to be a WTO member in 2003 were disrupted with the newly 
instituted tariffs on steel by the US because in response to this act Russia put a 
tariff imposition on the US poultry.
231
 While increasing the tariff rate up to 30% 
for steel, the US aim was to help its troubled industry but in response to this act, 
the Russian answer was to stop issuing import licensing for the US poultry and 
banning imports, which had an important negative effect on the US economy.
232
 
However, such issues were not the ultimate reason for the membership 
postponement. 
 When Putin’s intention and efforts to be a WTO member and the support 
from the WTO as well as the US and the EU are taken into consideration, the 
Russian WTO accession may seem inevitable in 2003. However, the membership 
failure was so expectable because Russia was not able to accomplish its trade 
commitments and conclude bilateral and multilateral agreements in such a short 
time frame. Therefore, the technical reasons did not allow Russia to accede to the 
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WTO. It was a miscalculation by both Russia and the WTO to set the year 2003 as 
a target because Russia as a former communist and huge economy could not turn 
into a running market economy in line with WTO criteria in such a constrained 
period. Even though Moore believed the idea that in today’s world it is easier to 
conclude negotiations because of “the understanding of both the task lying before 
us and the need to deliver speedy dividends from the acceleration of the 
globalization process,”233 this was not the case for the Russian WTO membership. 
 The vast agenda was full of commitments for Russia to harmonize itself 
with in line with the WTO in addition to the requirement of signing bilateral 
negotiations with several requested countries. These circumstances protracted the 
Russian WTO accession process. Russia even had not signed the bilateral 
agreements with the US and the EU, which were the important actors in the WTO 
in this term. The commitments were composed of several areas from goods to 
services and from trade related investment measures to intellectual property rights. 
It would take time to decrease the tariff rates in several areas and repeal subsidies 
in several sectors. Russia needed more time to negotiate the tariff rates to make the 
accession less painful for its sectors. 
 On the other hand, even though the negotiations had been completed, what 
was important for the WTO was not only the legislation changes but also the 
effective application of the rules in practice. The harmonization of application 
would certainly require time, especially where the economy was dominated by the 
oligarchs who were seeking their own economic interest, to achieve such a 
transformation.  
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 In this term, the accession could not be achieved but the experienced 
process was crucial in terms of establishing a general awareness about the WTO 
among the Russian public. The first presidential term of of Putin was also 
described as “a period of little readiness for concessions” about the Russian WTO 
accession.
234
 This readiness was the subject both for the government and private 
sector. Namely, in this term Russia discovered its powerful sectors in the market 
and tried to decide whether to give some concessions for the WTO accession or 
protect the nationally strategic sectors and give them a chance to adopt themselves 
for the new environment. Alexei Kudrin, the Finance Minister at the time, revealed 
Russia’s dilemma in Putin’s first presidency and stated how Russia acted in WTO 
negotiations by stating that: "There is a limit for the price Russia is ready to pay 
for the WTO accession. Russia cannot go beyond the limit set by its economic 
situation and the long-term development strategy."
235
 Furthermore, Putin 
expressed his thoughts in his 1999 Millennium Speech and stated that Russia had 
to continue its work to achieve a market economy and democracy, however it 
should combine them with the realities and values of Russia.
236
 Thus, by 2003, 
Russia was torn between concessions that would be given for the accession and the 
possible advantages of the membership. 
 All in all, selecting the year 2003 as the target for Russia to be a WTO 
member was optimistic when Russia’s commitments to the WTO are taken into 
consideration. Even though both Russia and the WTO believed in accession in the 
stated date, due to technical unpreparedness there was no success by that time. 
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However, the term was important to create a general consciousness among the 
public about the issue of concern, which was the Russian WTO accession.  
 
4.3 Putin’s Second Presidential Term (2004-2008) 
 Putin was reelected as the President of Russia in March 2004. The arrest of 
Mikhail Khodorkovski and the confiscation of Yukos in 2003, the acquisition of 
the majority of the seats in the Parliament in December 2003 and the replacement 
of the Prime Minister who was dealing with the Russian WTO negotiations 
Mikhail Kasyanov with a passive person Mikhail Fradkov were the actions that led 
to the darkening of the liberal atmosphere in Putin’s second presidential term and 
harmed the WTO accession process as well.
237
  
 In terms of the Russian WTO membership, asymmetrical developments 
were experienced throughout this period. Putin, in a 2005 Internet speech, made 
reference to the benefits of being a WTO member as follows: “The contemporary 
WTO facilitates global trade development. It is a kind of quality certificate, that 
provides favorable conditions for investment, increases the country’s credibility, 
and it is obviously an advantage.”238 Similarly, in his annual speech in May 2006, 
he addressed the integration of the Russian economy with the world economy and 
Russian efforts for being a WTO member.
239
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 However, Putin was much more aggressive towards the liberal world 
system in his televised question and answer session with the nation in 2006 in 
which he was mentioning protectionist measures such as an increase in subsidies, 
customs duties and tariff rates in trade as opposed to WTO requirements.
240
 In 
2008, Putin defended a diametrically opposite idea about the Russian WTO 
accession and stated in his speech to the Presidium of the Council of Ministers of 
Russia that: “We don’t feel or see any advantages from membership, if they exist 
at all. But we are carrying the burden.”241 
 Even though there was a negative inclination in Putin’s rhetoric, in 2004 
Russia signed bilateral protocols with the EU and in 2006 with the US which were 
important improvements on the way to WTO membership. These agreements were 
crucial because on the one hand Russia took the support of the key actors for the 
Russian WTO membership but on the other hand Russia reawakened its promises 
to the WTO and its members once again. Therefore, when the signing of these two 
important bilateral negotiations are taken into consideration, it signalled that in this 
presidential term, the WTO accession efforts did not end, even though there was 
loss of motivation due to the ten years that had passed without accession.  
 
4.3.1 Russian WTO Accession Failure of 2007 
 After the 2003 accession failure, the end of 2007 was seen as the possible 
entry year for Russia; however, even though two of the important bilateral 
negotiations had finished with the US and the EU, there was no success in 
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negotiations for consensus building in Putin’s second presidential term due to 
several reasons. Some technical problems continued, but more particularly in this 
term political obstacles were at the forefront.  
 First of all, the requirement of signing the bilateral protocols with the 
requestor WTO members was an important burden. With every bilateral 
negotiation, Russian commitments to be a WTO member increased. This problem 
was caused due to the decision making rule of the WTO which was consensus and 
could be regarded as a technical problem that was common with the 2003 failure. 
 Russia was affected by this requirement of the WTO accession more than 
other countries due to its historical background and its large economic structure. In 
the WTO accession, if a country has a large economy, then it is a disadvantage 
because several countries become interested in possible effects of the entrance of a 
large economy on their own sectors.
242
 The communist background and the 
relations with the other countries in former Soviet times also made several 
countries demand from Russia to sign bilateral protocols with themselves. In 
conclusion, history matters when a country’s decisions are in question, as Naray 
explains in his book that: 
There are countries which are closer to the integration into the world trade 
system. The big question is: why are the economic systems which exist 
today, all based on market economy principles, so different? Why do they 
differ so greatly in terms of economic, institutional and political 
development and business culture? Who could deny that today’s capitalism 
of Western Europe or the United States differs substantially from that of 
India, Pakistan, Latin America or Africa? And of course economic systems 
in Russia and in many other transition economies reveal even more 
dissenting features. The answer is simple; different historical backgrounds. 
The differences between counties’ business culture, institutions or indeed, 
the behavior of their citizens and subjects are as different as the unique 
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histories which shaped those countries. This historical determinism is 
relevant for defining country’s relationship with global organizations, or in 
this case with the WTO.
243
  
 
 In addition to the countries that requested bilateral negotiations at the 
beginning, every year there were some new countries added to the WTO cadre 
such as Cambodia, Saudi Arabia and Vietnam and they also were asking Russia 
for bilateral protocols on the market accession of Russia.
244
 Every new bilateral 
agreement meant new preparations and took time for scheduling. Furthermore, 
even though a country signed the agreement, there was the chance to withdraw 
from this bilateral protocol like in the example of Georgia which would add some 
more complications for the Russian WTO membership.
245
 
 Aside from these protocols, there was the question of excessive demands 
imposed on Russia for the WTO membership which were called “WTO plus.” The 
issue could be regarded as a political complication. Additional requests, even 
though not so serious, were irritating Russia in the already protracted process. 
However, Tarr answers this claim by stating that: “The evidence reveals that, aside 
from a couple of well-publicized cases where unusual demands were placed on 
Russia, such demands are typical of the WTO accession process in the past ten 
years.”246  
 The lack of mutual trust among Russia and the WTO was another political 
factor that prevented Russia to accede to the WTO.  The replacement of the Prime 
Minister with a passive one was effective on the slowing down of accession 
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process. Moreover, there was not any internal cohesion in Putin’s words towards 
the WTO. According to Aslund, Putin “seems to have been riding two horses: one 
was his populist protectionism while the other was a realist foreign policy geared 
toward the United States.”247 This statement also was the the position of Russia for 
the WTO. Towards the end of his second presidential term, a negative change in 
Putin’s rhetoric started to be observed for being a WTO member. There are 
possible reasons that had an effect on this situation.   
 Firstly, the political atmosphere could have caused a change in Putin’s 
stance towards the membership in his second term. By being reelected as president 
in March 2004, he gained much more confidence and as Aslund states that, “As 
Putin consolidated authoritarian power, the liberal market economic insignia of his 
first term faded.”248 Actually, before that date, in December 2003, the 
parliamentary elections were held in Russia and Putin’s party won almost all the 
seats and there was no opposition in the parliament anymore. This power and 
confidence might be the cause of the change in Putin’s speeches. 
 Secondly, “abundance of petrodollars” could have influenced Putin’s and 
the oligarchs’ unwillingness towards the WTO accession.249 As Gidadhubli states, 
as a consequence of gaining so much money out of increasing oil prices, the 
leaders thought that there was no need for the WTO accession, as such, they 
damaged the investment climate by reducing the share of the non-Russians in joint 
ventures of oil companies in Russia.
250
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 Thirdly, Putin had entered into a much stricter relationship with siloviki in 
the country, which was comprised of a kind of “crony capitalism”251 in his second 
presidential term. Kerr did not believe that the accession to the WTO would 
correct this paralyzed relationship within the country: “Many trade agreements 
involving developing countries never amount to much more than photo ops even if 
the intent of the politicians is trade liberalization at the time of signing.”252 Sutela 
differentiates corruption and cronyism, asserting, “Corruption to most seems to 
refer to a deviance from rule. Cronyism is rather the rule itself.”253 Therefore, 
siloviki that would have liked to gain economic interest by benefiting from the 
holes of the Russian economy could have had an effect on Putin’s negative stance 
towards the end of his second presidential term. 
 Apart from all these reasons, there were some more problems that had an 
impact on the Russian WTO accession, but were prosaic compared to the others. 
For instance, the increase in the export duties on timber harmed the Russian WTO 
membership in Putin’s second presidential term as well as the deteriorating 
relations with Estonia due to the oil prices and energy routes.
254
 However, these 
were the problems that could be solved easily when the other conditions were 
settled. 
 The most important political reason that complicated the Russian WTO 
accession process was the relations with Georgia, which was not so warm since the 
Rose Revolution in 2003, in which the EU had brought Saakashvili, who was more 
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inclined to the West, to power while deposing Shevardnadze.
255
 In 2004, after 
Saakashvili won the parliamentary and presidential elections, he had declared his 
priority as to end the conflicts with secessionist regions Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia. However, the relations with these regions not only involved domestic 
conflicts but also included power relations of the US and Russia behind the scene 
due to Georgia’s geostrategic importance.256  
 While the situation was so tense between Georgia and Russia, in 2006, due 
to sanitary conditions Russia had stopped large imports of Georgian wine and 
fruits to Russia and the relations deteriorated more in the summer of the year with 
the Georgian arrest of four Russian officers on the accusation of being spies.
257
 In 
retaliation, Russian troops stationed in Georgia received an order to be in a “high 
alert” position and “shoot to kill if provoked” order further strained the 
relations.
258
 As a consequence of this crisis, Russia recalled its ambassador to 
Georgia by declaring Georgia a bandit state and stopped giving visas to 
Georgians.
259
 Moreover, Russia was planning some more actions towards Georgia 
as deputy speaker of the lower house of the Russian Parliament Yury Volkov 
stated that: “The measures against Georgia could comprise diplomatic action and 
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economic sanctions, including the freezing of bank accounts, and suspending or 
annulling business contracts.”260  
 Georgia had already signed its bilateral agreement on the market access of 
Russia in 2004 but with this tension, Georgia withdrew from this agreement and it 
was difficult to sign a new bilateral protocol among these nations.
261
 Russian-
Georgian relations became tenser and this situation affected the Russian WTO 
accession negatively, even causing Russia to miss the chance acceding to the 
organization by the end of 2007. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
260
 “Wrap: Russian Politicians on Offensive over Georgia Spy Scandal,” Rianovosti, September 29, 
2006, last accessed December 8, 2013, http://en.ria.ru/russia/20060929/54387361.html. 
261
 Anders Aslund, “Russia’s Accession to the World Trade Organization,” 300. 
78 
 
 
 
CHAPTER V 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
The Russian economic transformation from a centrally planned economy to 
a market driven economy in the 1990s was not only an important but also a 
spectacular issue. The Russian Federation that used to be in the Soviet Union was 
a communist country for approximately 70 years and was a fervent supporter of 
this ideology. Then, after almost 20 years since the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union, in 2012, Russia became a member of the WTO. Russian WTO membership 
had an importance for its economy as well as for the other countries because of 
Russia’s vast resources and its hunger for the services sector.  
The Russian WTO accession was a protracted process and can be 
investigated from plenty of different perspectives. This study aimed to discover the 
underlying reasons for the Russian 2003 and 2007 accession failures. However, in 
order to be able to list the reasons in a comprehensive way, the historical 
background was explained in a detailed manner starting from the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union, namely from the beginning of the market economy practices in the 
Yeltsin era, until to the end of Putin’s first and second presidential terms. At the 
79 
 
end of the thesis, it is found that the underlying reason of 2003 accession failure 
was technical whereas 2007 accession failure was mostly affected from the 
political causes in addition to the continued technical ones. 
It can be learned from the thesis that the WTO decision making rule is 
consensus and this makes the accession process of the countries harder. Even 
though not every applicant experienced such a long accession period as Russia did, 
the accession procedure is standard. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, 
Yeltsin’s presidential term started and essential reforms for changing the Russian 
communist economy had been conducted. These reforms were important in terms 
of constituting the market economy institutions and becoming acclimated to 
market economy practices. 
In his presidential terms, Yeltsin established the main building blocks for 
Russia to be a running market economy through his reforms which were important 
for the Russian WTO accession in the future such as liberalization of prices and 
privatization of government assets. After applying to GATT in 1993, being a 
GATT or later WTO member was not at the top of Yeltsin’s agenda due to the 
economic malfunction and unpreparedness for the WTO accession. However, still 
in his term, the WP for the Russian WTO accession had been gathered and the 
Memorandum of Foreign Trade Regime had been submitted to the WTO. The 
1998 economic crisis disappointed the WP members but at the same time 
encouraged the Russian Federation to be a member of the WTO to protect its 
sectors from severe economic fluctuation.  
 The achievements on the way to the Russian WTO membership in Putin’s 
presidential terms were remarkable. Above all, Russian WTO accession was at the 
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top of the political agenda. Between the years 2000-2004, Putin tried to strengthen 
the Russian legal base through tax reform, customs reform and some other reforms 
related directly to the Russian economy and in line with the WTO requirements. 
However, even though being a WTO member at the end of 2003 was aimed for, 
Putin was not successful. The reason for this accession failure was found in this 
study as the impossibility of harmonizing the Russian economy with the WTO 
commitments in such a short time period as well as concluding several bilateral 
agreements in this limited time. Namely, it was understood by Putin and his team 
that being a WTO member was more than the political consensus and the 
difficulties of the already given commitments such as decreasing tariff rates in 
sensitive sectors such as automobile and cutting of the subsidies in agriculture 
sector came to light. However, the advantage of the term was the creation of a 
general consciousness about the WTO. Throughout thesis, the reasons for the 
increased popularity of the Russian WTO membership in Putin’s first presidential 
term also are discovered.  
 When Putin’s second presidential term is taken into consideration, it was 
found that there were mostly political reasons in addition to continuing technical 
reasons for the delay in the Russian WTO membership. The number of the 
protocols which were increasing with every new WTO member constituted an 
important technical hurdle for Russia throughout the process because with the 
agreements new commitments were being raised for Russia.  
 Apart from technical reasons, in addition to the existing agreements, the 
threat of withdrawal or not signing the bilateral protocol when the relations were 
getting tense with some countries was politically problematic for Russia. Lack of 
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mutual trust between the WTO and Russia could be counted as another political 
reason for not being able to be a WTO member in this term. For example, the 
arrest of Khodorkovski was an event that undermined the Russian position in the 
WTO accession process because the openness and transparency of the trade 
atmosphere was one of the important achievements that the WTO wanted to 
experience in Russia through the accession. Furthermore, the appointment of a 
passive prime minister who would conduct the Russian WTO accession was 
another harmful act of this term. Namely, there were signs of tiredness in Russia 
regarding the WTO membership. The reasons for the negative change in Putin’s 
rhetoric towards the end of his second presidential term also were tried to be 
discovered in this study because this position affected the Russian WTO accession 
and motivation adversely. 
However, even though the membership was not achieved in either Putin’s 
first or second term, Russia was much closer to the WTO membership by the end 
of 2007 compared to the Yeltsin era. There had been some reforms on tax and 
customs in Putin’s first presidency in order to harmonize these areas in line with 
WTO rules. In his second presidential term, the bilateral protocols on the market 
accession of Russia had been signed with the two important actors of the WTO: 
the US and the EU. The Russian economy was a market economy, although with 
some troubles, and privatization had been achieved. However, although democracy 
failed, market reform succeeded in Russia.
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5.1 Russian WTO Accession Process after Putin (2008-2012) 
 After Putin, the Russian WTO membership process continued for four 
more years. On 22 August 2012, Russia became the 156
th
 member of the WTO 
after almost 19 years of negotiations under the third presidency of Putin.
263
 
 In Medvedev’s presidential term, the global financial crisis rooted in the 
US subprime mortgage crisis hit Russia in September 2008 and resulted in a 
decrease in oil prices as well as capital outflows from Russia to much safer 
countries.
264
 As a result, $200 billion of Russian foreign currency reserves had 
been spent to stabilize the ruble and rising unemployment.
265
 However, one of the 
lessons learned from the crisis was Russia’s urgent need to integrate into the global 
economy through WTO membership. That is why the crisis could be evaluated as 
the positive development for the Russian WTO accession. In April 2009, US 
President Obama and Medvedev were together at the G20 Summit where Obama 
had indicated that the US was ready to do whatever it could for the Russian WTO 
accession.
266
 
       The 2008 economic crisis reminded Russian government and private sector 
the Russian dependency on energy and addiction to resource rents.
267
 Furthermore, 
the crisis had prompted Russia to reevaluate the advantages of being a rapidly 
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rising power and gave the West the chance to force Russia for fundamental 
economic reforms and integration to the world economy.
268
  
 In his presidential term, Medvedev continued to carry out Russia’s relations 
with the US and the EU and tried to take their support in the WTO process. In 
2011, during a meeting with the US Vice President Joe Biden in Russia, Medvedev 
expressed his intention about the Russian WTO accession with the help of the 
US
269
 and in December 2012 Obama cancelled the Jackson-Vanik Amendment 
which was introduced in 1974.
270
 In this term, not only the US but also the EU 
waived the veto against Russian WTO membership because Russia promised to 
phase out some export tariffs which the EU was against. At the annual EU-Russia 
Summit in Brussels, Medvedev stated that: “Following our agreements with the 
US and now with the EU, Russia joining the WTO becomes, practically, a 
reality.”271 Furthermore, in Medvedev’s presidency, some complementary 
legislation changes were made. Some legislation against corruption and violation 
of the intellectual property rights, which were the main obstacles for the WTO 
entry were adopted in this term.  
 There were some negative events for the Russian WTO accession, as well. 
In June 2009, Putin declared that Russia formed a single customs union together 
with Belarus and Kazakhstan and they abandoned their separate talks to join the 
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WTO
272
 but then, they decided to continue with individual negotiations. However, 
even though Putin’s declaration created a kind of skepticism about the real 
intentions of Russia, the customs union was taking into consideration all the rules 
of the WTO regime in order to avoid conflict between the regimes and the WTO 
provisions would prevail over the union ones.
273
 That is why as opposed to what 
Aslund states, “Putin simply called for a halt to Russia’s accession to the WTO for 
the foreseeable future,”274 Portanski has the idea that it would be beneficial to 
compose such a union for Russia but it should be gradual.
275
  
 Another hurdle in the Russian WTO accession process in Medvedev’s 
presidency term was the 2008 Russian-Georgian War after which Russia 
recognized the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Georgia had vetoed 
the Russian WTO accession with the condition of deploying Georgian units to 
monitor the trade at the border of Abkhazia and Ossetia with Russia but through 
Switzerland’s mediation, a private firm had put at the border and Georgia returned 
back to the negotiations for the Russian WTO membership because it was satisfied 
with this achievement.
276
 
 Thorughout this war, the US threatened Russia with economic sanctions 
but unlike the Russian reaction to the tension in Ukraine after being a WTO 
member in 2014, Russia could not file a lawsuit in the WTO and use the dispute 
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settlement mechanism to overcome these sanctions. Georgia continued 
negotiations for the Russian WTO accession because there were some advantages 
that Georgia would also obtain with this membership. It was thought that when 
Russia became a WTO member, it would be harder for Russia to put restrictions 
on Georgian goods such as wine and mineral water and the accession would help 
Georgian’s security when the insecure trade regions Abkhazia and Ossetia were 
taken into consideration.
277
 Finally, with Switzerland’s mediation, the Russian 
WTO accession was achieved.  
 
5.2 Future Research 
 During the 2008 Russian-Georgian War, Russia encountered economic 
sanctions applied by some WTO members such as the US and the EU, but Russia’s 
position was stronger in crisis with Ukraine in 2014 as a WTO member. By 
knowing to prohibit the other WTO members to put economic sanctions against 
Russia which are not in line with their commitments related to GATT, GATS, 
TRIPs and TRIMs Agreements, Russia gained an advantage, exploited the WTO 
tools for its economic interests and adjusted the countries by using the WTO tools.  
 On 16 April 2014, Russian Economy Minister Alexei Ulyukayev 
announced that Russia plans to file a lawsuit against the US in the WTO because 
of the US sanctions that harmed the Russian banks and went against the TRIMs 
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Agreement.
278
 However, rather than ordinary cases, the results of this lawsuit 
cannot be estimated because sanctions on trade for geopolitical reasons have never 
been tested in the WTO.
279
 The US had applied for an economic embargo on 
Cuba, which was a GATT member country, by referencing the Article XIV of 
GATS, which includes security exceptions, but the issue was never announced as a 
formal case by the Cubans. Therefore, even though the case would take at least 
three years to conclude, it can serve as a model for the other cases in the future and 
give free hand to Russia in its relations with problematic regions. 
 The Russian WTO accession was achieved almost after 19 years, but it is 
obvious that Russia recognized the most useful tools for its economic interests 
throughout this process. Therefore, with the new developments that have occurred 
after the Russian WTO accession, future study can be conducted specifically on 
how Russia is using its WTO membership effectively to confront the political and 
economic sanctions of the other WTO members. 
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APPENDICES 
 
 
 
Appendix I: Average Tariff Levels for the US and Major European 
Countries
280
 
 
Country 1913 1925 1931 1952 2007
a
 
Belgium 6 7 17 n.a. 5.2 
France 14 9 38 19 5.2 
Germany 12 15 40 16 5.2 
Italy 17 16 48 24 5.2 
United Kingdom n.a. 4 17 17 5.2 
United States 32 26 35 9 3.5 
n.a. = Not available. 
a. Tariff levels for each European Community member country represent the EC-wide 
import tariff rate. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
280 Data was the collection of the information taken from Irwin Douglas, Free Trade Under Fire, 
(New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2002) and World Tariff Profiles 2008, (Geneva: WTO 
and International Trade Center, 2008), quoted in Chad P. Bown, Self Enforcing Trade: Developing 
Countries and WTO Dispute Settlement, (Washington: Brookings Institution, 2009), 12. 
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Appendix II: GATT Trade Rounds
281
 
 
Year Place/name Subjects covered Countries 
1947 Geneva Tariffs 23 
1949 Annecy Tariffs 13 
1951 Torquay Tariffs 38 
1956 Geneva Tariffs 26 
1960-1961 Geneva 
Dillon Round 
Tariffs 26 
1964-1967 Geneva 
Kennedy Round 
Tariffs and anti-dumping 
measures 
62 
1973-1979 Geneva 
Tokyo Round 
Tariffs, non-tariff measures, 
“framework” 
agreements 
102 
1986-1994 Geneva 
Uruguay Round 
Tariffs, non-tariff measures, rules, 
services, intellectual property, 
dispute settlement, textiles, 
agriculture, creation of WTO, etc. 
123 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
281 “The GATT Years: From Havana to Marrakesh,” WTO Website, last accessed September 12, 
2013, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact4_e.htm. 
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Appendix III: How to Become a WTO Member Diagram
282
 
 
 
                                                          
282
 “How to Become a Member of the WTO,” WTO Website, last accessed September 12, 2013, 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/acces_e.htm. 
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Appendix IV: Agricultural Imports by Major Emerging Markets
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Appendix V: Oil-Price Aggression Relationship
284
 
 
 
                                                          
283 “World Trade Atlas,” Global Trade Information Services, quoted in William M. Liefert and 
Olga Liefert, “Russian Agriculture During Transition: Performance, Global Impact and Outlook,” 
Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy 34, no.1 (2012): 53. 
284
 Charlie Szrom and Thomas Brugato, “Liquid Courage,” The American, (2008), last accessed 
April 29, 2014, http://www.american.com/archive/2008/february-02-08/liquid-courage. 
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